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Abstract 
In emerging economies, high investment costs hinder fast renewable energy (RE) deployment. 
Compared to industrial states, higher financial costs originate mainly from investment barriers 
and consequently risks. Using Vietnam as a case study for emerging economies, the objective 
of this thesis is to identify barriers and ways to remove risks by developing a de-risking policy 
mix that consequently helps to increase RE deployment rates. The study finds out that, even 
though Vietnam’s climate are favorable for RE projects, however, the country’s contextual 
policy settings are not conducive to investments. Additionally, an ex-post effectiveness analysis 
of current policies showed that they are not working effectively yet. Barriers were identified with 
the help of a newly developed analytical framework that has a higher usability than common 
ones. The main barriers are deep-rooted structural barriers, such as the permitting process and 
corruption. The policy recommendations developed in this thesis suggest to change the 
cornerstone instrument to a new auctioning system, the “One Stop Auctioning System” 
(OSAS), which was developed in this thesis. It minimizes the contact between investors and 
local authorities and with it the options for corruption and delays. This instrument, combined 
with secondary de-risk instruments, like capacity building on all relevant levels and sectors 
(public and private), the introduction of a university program on RE, or improved access to 
capital by introducing public loan guarantees, has high chances to make emerging economies 
like Vietnam a more attractive country for RE investments. 
 
Keywords: Renewable Energy, De-Risking, One Stop Auctioning System, Barriers 
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Executive Summary 
In emerging economies, high investment costs hinder fast renewable energy (RE) deployment. 
Compared to industrial states, higher financial costs originate mainly from investment barriers 
and consequently risks. Generally, investors are looking for stable investment environments 
with secured financial rewards, which is not given in most developing countries (Climate Policy 
Initiative, 2015). The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Deutsche Bank 
Group developed a new approach to increase the diffusion of RE in developing countries. In 
2011 they presented a de-risking approach (Schmidt, 2014; Frisari & Valerio, 2015). The right 
set of de-risking policies decreases the risks of RE investments and establishes a good 
investment climate that helps to increase the RE deployment rate (Deutsche Bank, Kahn, 
Mellquist, & Sharples, 2011; UNDP, Waissbein, Glemarec, Bayraktar, & Schmidt, 2013).  
This thesis uses the case of Vietnam as a country in transition with high economic growth rates 
and energy demand. The literature on RE in Vietnam assesses the market (Pham Khanh, 
Nguyen Anh, & Quan Minh Quoc, 2012; ADB, 2015), the RE potential (Nguyen Ninh Hai, 
Dang Huy Cuong, & Pham Trong Thuc, 2015; Nguyen Ninh Hai et al., 2015; Asian 
Development Bank, 2015b) and energy policies (Minh Do & Sharma, 2011; Khanh Toan, Minh 
Bao, & Ha Dieu, 2011; UNDP, 2012a).  
The new de-risk approach has been applied on few case studies only. These are from Kenya, 
Mongolia, Panama and South Africa (UNDP et al., 2013). No country in South East Asia has 
been assessed on de-risking yet. By applying the de-risking approach on Vietnam, this thesis 
closes a knowledge gap. Having more information on ways to reduce RE investment risks in 
emerging economies could help to increase their deployment.  
This thesis aims to contribute to the diffusion of RE in emerging economies. With the case 
study of Vietnam, it intends to increase the deployment rate of large-scale RE projects in the 
country and in similar ones. The objective of this thesis is to present insights in reasons for slow 
deployment and how the de-risking approach can help to increase future deployment. This 
thesis analyzes the contextual settings as well as current policies. It further provides information 
for strategic de-risking approaches that lower the costs of RE projects by decreasing investors’ 
risks.  
This thesis asks two questions: 
1. How conducive is Vietnam’s contextual setting to renewable energy investment?  
2. What are possible ways to de-risk renewable energy investments in Vietnam? 
 
Methodology  
This thesis starts with a literature review of barriers and risk as well as of different de-risking 
approaches for RE investments to get an understanding of the theoretical approach. It follows 
a systematic collection of renewable energy-related information in Vietnam, which serves as a 
first step to get familiar with the country and its context. The chapter identifies and describes 
the country context. It gives an overview of Vietnam’s current state and presents the energy 
sector in detail with a focus on RE and aspects that are crucial for investors like the permitting 
process of RE projects. 
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After the country context an ex-post effectiveness analysis of the current RE policies is assessed. 
This is followed by an ex-post analysis of RE investment barriers and risks in Vietnam. During 
the literature review it occurred that the common analytical frameworks have shortcomings. 
The UNDP framework has an approach that is not user-friendly. Therefore, a new analytical 
framework, inspired by the UNDP framework, was developed and applied to identify RE 
investment barriers. The foundation for the analysis was desk research and semi-structured 
interviews, that were conducted face-to-face. After the identification of barriers and risks policy 
scenarios with de-risk instruments were developed.  
 
Main Findings 
The identification of barriers showed that deep-rooted structural barriers are the main problem 
for slow RE deployment in Vietnam. The permitting process is complex & time consuming, the 
diffusion of information as well as the communication and cooperation among (public) actors 
is insufficient. An omnipresent barrier is corruption. The analysis further showed, that the access 
to capital for large-scale RE project is difficult. On the informational side, there is a lack of 
know-how and a lack of skilled labor. The current RE support policy mix, which includes a 
Feed-in tariff (FiT) does not remove the barriers. 
Policy Recommendations 
This thesis suggests to change the cornerstone instrument to an auctioning system. Unlike (high) 
FiTs, the “One Stop Auctioning System” (OSAS) developed in this thesis has the chance to 
remove deep-rooted investment barriers. An increased FiT, which is promoted by most 
international actor in Vietnam, could lead to higher deployment rates eventually. However, most 
likely it would come at the cost of the local population in Vietnam who would have to pay bribes 
in the RE permitting process with their electricity bills. The OSAS minimizes the contact 
between investors and local authorities and with it the options for corruption and delays.  
This instrument, combined with secondary de-risk instruments, like capacity building on all 
relevant levels and sectors (public and private), the introduction of a university program on RE, 
improved access to capital by introducing public loan guarantees, has high chances to make 
Vietnam a more attractive country for RE investors. Furthermore, local governments should be 
(financially) incentivized to offer land to project developers. 
This thesis gives an impulse to policymakers as well as international experts who fight 
(unsuccessfully) for higher FITs in emerging economies. The result of this thesis is in particular 
valuable for countries, that are ranked high in the Transparency International corruption index, 
because the OSAS has the chance to remove deep-rooted barriers like corruption.  
1. Identify and 
describe country 
context 
2. Effectiveness 
analysis of 
current policies
3. Identify 
barriers and 
risks
4. Policy 
scenarios with 
de-risk 
instruments 
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1 Introduction 
This chapter is an introduction into the topic and explains the connection between climate 
change and the energy sector, Vietnam’s power development, financial aspects of energy 
transition and energy challenges in emerging economies. It further gives basic information about 
the research endeavour such as aim and research question. 
The United Nations (UN) Conference of the Parties (COP) on Climate Change in Paris, held 
in December 2015, was a wakeup call for the global community to act unified in the fight against 
climate change (Nuccitelli, 2015). Greenhouse gas emissions (GHG), which are responsible for 
climate change are as high as never before and continue rising (Pachauri, Mayer, & 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2015; International Energy Agency, 2014b). 
A continuation of today’s amounts or an increase would have devastating impacts for people 
and ecosystems globally. Already today climate change can be noticed and measured: the 
atmosphere as well as oceans are warmer than in the past, which leads to melding glaciers 
(Pachauri et al., 2015). The 2014 IPCC report on mitigation of climate change highly 
recommends to keep the global temperature increase under 2 degrees Celsius over the 21st 
century (Edenhofer, Pichs-Madruga, Sokona, & Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
2014). The report says, the concentration of GHG in the atmosphere must not get higher than 
450 CO2 parts per million (ppm). 
In the year 2007 Sir Nicolas Stern’s study on climate change, written for the British Government, 
received much attention globally. He argued that big investments have to be done in order to 
minimize the negative effects of climate change (Stern & Great Britain, 2007). Early and 
committed actions and investment would be financially cheaper than not acting, he states. 
Hence not acting and therewith allowing higher CO2 concentrations to change the climate 
would have grave consequences on water supply, food production and would also lead to an 
increase of natural disasters. The report further states that the changes combined would lead to 
a global gross domestic product (GDP) loss of about 5% annually (Stern & Great Britain, 2007).  
On a global level there is consensus about the need of actions against climate change. This is 
expressed by several agreements such as the Paris Agreement from December 2015. However, 
developing countries and in particular countries with rapidly emerging economies experience 
difficulties in achieving their climate goals, especially because their fast increasing energy 
demand. Policy makers, environmentalists and energy experts agree that the energy sector is key 
in the fight against climate change (DeMartino, LeBlanc, & others, 2010; International Energy 
Agency, 2014b, International Energy Agency, 2015). Numbers support this assessment: 
electricity and heat production is globally the largest contributor to GHG emissions and is 
responsible for about 25% of total anthropogenic GHG (Edenhofer et al., 2014). Global GHG 
emissions are steadily increasing, mostly due to economic growth and consequently increasing 
energy consumption (Edenhofer et al., 2014). World-wide, coal, the primary energy with the 
highest specific CO2 emission, has the highest share in the energy mix. 2012 is was accountable 
for 40% of global energy supply (International Energy Agency, 2014b).  
While acting towards a reduction of GHG in the energy sector it is important to note that under 
the current global political and economic system it is not an option to reduce global economic 
growth. Developing countries in particular aim to strengthen their economies. Energy is the 
fundamental base of economic development (Johansson, Patwardhan, Nakićenović, Gomez-
Echeverri, & International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 2012). There is hardly any 
social, nor industrial, activities without it. With economic growth and industrial development, 
societies get richer and consequently start consuming even more energy (IEA, 2013; Chow, 
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Kopp, & Portney, 2003). Today developing countries are going through a phase, most industrial 
countries went through in the late 19th century during the industrialization (Smil, 2010). During 
the industrialization of today’s industrialized countries electricity was mostly generated by coal 
power plants and hydropower. Back then neither the consequences of higher CO2 emissions on 
climate change, nor the consequences of SMOG on human health were known. Today, both 
negative consequences are well known.  
However, as Goldemberg points out, developing countries do not necessarily have to follow 
the exact path of industrial countries (Goldemberg & others, 1998). Today technologies are 
improved and new technologies are available. Leapfrogging old technologies is an option 
developing countries can apply in the energy sector1. Nowadays there are renewable energy (RE) 
technologies that allow developing countries to skip the fossil fuel based power plants, that were 
used for the industrialisation in the 19th century. However, studies show that usually only after 
reaching a certain economic level the energy intensity2 of an economy decreases (Sadorsky, 
2013).  
The global demand for coal power plants proofs this point. Maiy countries are in a dilemma 
between financially cheap energy and low carbon solutions. Due to lower initial investment 
costs, compared to RE technologies and lower fuel costs compared to gas-fired plants, there is 
still high demand for coal power plants worldwide (IEA & OECD, 2015; Viet Nam News, 
2015a). Even though gas-fired power plants have advantages over coal-fired power plants (they 
emit less CO2, have lower initial investment costs, are easier to regulate) in most countries, the 
operational costs are higher than the operational costs of coal-fired counterparts. Only in few 
countries e.g. in the United States of America (USA) gas is cheaper than coal (Pickering, 2012; 
Knittel, Metaxoglou, & Trindade, 2016; IEA & OECD, 2015).  
An additional energy challenge in developing countries are regions that are not connected to a 
power grid yet. Worldwide there are still about 1.3 billion people without access to modern 
energy (electricity). About 3 billion people depend on wood, coal and other solid fuels for 
cooking and heating (AGECC, 2010; Edenhofer et al., 2014). Efforts to connect the billions of 
people without modern electricity were increasing in the last couple of years (Johansson et al., 
2012). Number 7.1 of the UN Sustainable Development Goal (SDGs) is: “by 2030, ensure 
universal access to affordable, reliable and modern energy services” (United Nations, 2015, p. 
n.a.). 
The Case of Vietnam 
Vietnam is an example of a country with high economic growth rates and a fast growing energy 
demand. It is a country in transition. The country’s economic growth rate has been more than 
5% annually for over a decade already (KfW Development Bank, 2015). The development is 
beneficial for the population in many ways: the infrastructure betters, the health system 
improves, people can afford better food and the overall life expectancy increases, to name a few 
improvements (Lam, 2016).  
However, with the development also many challenges arise. The fast increase in the energy 
demand leads to frequent energy shortages. The electricity demand increases by about 10% year 
after year. This is due to higher production of goods for the domestic and global market and 
                                                 
1 A common example for “leapfrogging” can be found in the telecommunications sector (Goldemberg & others, 1998). 
Landlines used to be the standard phone technology in industrial countries. Only after many years of successful use the newer 
mobile phone technology was developed and proliferated. In developing countries, many people skip landlines and aquire a 
mobile phone right away. This is called leapfrogging a technology. 
2 Energy Intensity shows the energy efficiency of a country’s economy 
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the use of more electric devices (electricity) by the Vietnamese population. The governmental 
answer is to quadruple the electricity supply capacity from an output of 19,735 Megawatts (MW) 
in 2010 to around 75,000 MW in 2020 (KfW Development Bank, 2015; Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam, 2015b). In 2015 the national power capacity was 34,000 MW, while in 2016 is expected 
to reach 38,000 MW (Vietnam Pictorial, 2015; Viet Nam News, 2016b).  
The socialist government plans to meet most of the increased electricity demand by building 
new new coal power plants. A statement by the prime minister Nguyen Tan Dung from the 
begining of 2016 shows the importance of the energy development: ”Energy is of paramount 
importance to Vietnam’s growth and it is a decisive factor for the country’s high and sustainable 
growth. It is difficult for Vietnam to realize growth targets if energy runs short” (Viet Nam 
Energy, 2016). To meet the demand some and to improve the electricity infrastructure Vietnam 
plans to spend US$130.64 billion in the period 2014-2030 (Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2016).  
Environmental and as well as health concerns are of secondary importance in the governmental 
plan. By relying mainly on coal power plants it will be difficult for Vietnam to achieve their CO2 
reduction goals. Prior to the climate conferences COP21 all countries had to submit their 
Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) (Sachs, 2015; Ji & Sha, 2015). Vietnam 
submitted a target to decrease the CO2 emissions by 8% until the year 2030 (baseline year 2010) 
and offers to decrease the emissions by up to 20% in the same period if the global community 
helps financially (Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2015c). Figure 1 shows the official projections 
of Vietnam’s GHG emission in million tons CO2 (not included industrial processes).  
 
Figure 1: Current and Projected GHG Emissions 
Source: (Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2015d) 
Additional to the increasing CO2 emission, Vietnam faces an air quality problem. In Vietnam 
the air quality in many cities is notably getting worse year after year (Phung et al., 2016). The 
main reasons for the worsening are electricity generation from fossil fuels, increasing individual 
transport by cars and motorbikes and industrial emissions. The Vietnamese population is getting 
concerned about the negative impact on their health. In a global study by Yale University the 
country ranks 170 out of 178 (YCELP, 2014). A study by Harvard University found out that in 
2011 4300 people died in Vietnam by pollution through coal power plants (Viet Nam News, 
2015a). Recently, in April 2016 even mercury was found in the air of the capital city Hanoi. The 
discovery created big concerns among the population (Thanh Nien Daily, 2016). Most likely the 
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mercury comes from coal power plants. Because of the severe health risk, caused by coal power 
plants citizens started to protest against the new deployment of them, which is a rare 
circumstance in socialist Vietnam where free speech is supressed (Big News Network, 2015).  
Financial Aspects 
The introduction showed the importance of the reduction of greenhouse gases in the energy 
sector globally, in order to mitigate climate change. Financial aspects make this aim difficult 
though. Yet, there is promising news. In the last couple of years, a higher demand of RE 
technology could be seen worldwide (IRENA, 2013). In 2014 US$270 billion were invested in 
renewable electricity capacity globally (REN21, 2015). In the same year 59% of all new installed 
capacity was RE (excluding large dams).  
The higher demand led to a learning curve that, combined with economies of scale, allowed 
technology suppliers to offer solutions for less money (Climate Policy Initiative, 2014). This 
development happened with all RE technologies. The price decrease of solar photovoltaic (PV) 
panels was impressive. The cost per module decreased by nearly 98% from 1979 to 2012 
(IRENA, 2013). Accordingly, in recent years, an enormous development took place. Between 
2009 and 2014 the price dropped by three quarters for PV (IRENA, 2015b). Wind turbines, 
which are the most expensive part of wind power farms also decrease in prices. Between 2008 
and 2014 the prices lowered by about 30% (IRENA, 2015b).  
Even though technology is getting cheaper, researchers and policy makers agree on the fact that 
an energy transition is only possible with very large investments. The World Energy Investment 
Outlook by the International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that the energy sector needs 
investments of about US$40 trillion until 2035 only to meet the global energy demand 
(International Energy Agency, 2014a). Figure 2 shows the costs in US$ trillion to meet the global 
energy demand. On top of the US$40 trillion another US$8 trillion are required for energy 
efficiency improvements.  
 
Figure 2: Projected Cumulative Global Investment to Meet Global Energy Demand 
Source: (International Energy Agency, 2014a) 
1.1 Energy Challenges in Emerging Economies 
Other organizations have developed similar scenarios. The United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs (UN-DESA) has developed scenarios that include a Global Feed-
in Tariff (GFIT) paid by industrial states. The subsidy would support all developing countries 
in their target to install new renewable electricity capacity offering their population a minimum 
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of 10 kilowatt-hours (KWh) per day/ person. The report states that the costs for industrial states 
would be low in the beginning and peak by about US$250–270 billion annually after around 15 
years (DeMartino et al., 2010; Hällström, Bhushan, Kumarankandath, & Goswami, 2014). In 
comparison: in 2015, total net official development assistance (ODA) from member countries 
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) were US$131.6 
billion (OECD, 2016).  
The investments cannot be done with public money solely since the sum required is too high. 
Instead energy transitions towards low carbon energy supply can only happen with the help of 
private investors (Climate Policy Initiative, 2014). It is key to attract them. Until today, 2014 was 
the year with the highest investments in low carbon and climate resilient projects (Climate Policy 
Initiative, 2015). Global climate finance increased by 18% to US$391 billion from 2013 to 2014. 
In the transition process towards low carbon energy sectors, developing countries need a whole 
range of support from industrial states. Financial support, capacity building and technology 
transfer are the key support areas. In Paris at the COP21, delegates from industrial countries 
assured developing countries financial assistance for sustainable development projects in order 
to decrease the global GHG emissions (Robbins, 2016). That means that in the near future even 
more money will be spend on RE projects in the global south.  
These recent developments make it central to know how to spend public money wisely. Even 
small public funding can help to mobilize both private and public investors and therewith 
leverage large investment sums (Brigham & Houston, 2007; International Energy Agency, 
2014b; IEA & OECD, 2015).  
1.2 Problem Statement  
High investment costs for RE projects in developing and emerging economies occur because 
of high investment risks. Generally, investors are looking for stable investment environments 
with secured financial rewards, which is not given in most developing countries (Climate Policy 
Initiative, 2015). The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Deutsche Bank 
Group developed a new approach to increase the diffusion of RE in developing countries. In 
2011 they presented a de-risking approach (Schmidt, 2014; Frisari & Valerio, 2015). The right 
set of policies (de-risking instruments) decreases the risks of RE investments and establishes a 
good investment climate that helps to increase the RE deployment rate (Deutsche Bank, Kahn, 
Mellquist, & Sharples, 2011; UNDP, Waissbein, Glemarec, Bayraktar, & Schmidt, 2013).  
This paper uses the case of Vietnam as a country in transition with high economic growth rates 
and energy demand. The literature on RE in Vietnam assess the market (Pham Khanh, Nguyen 
Anh, & Quan Minh Quoc, 2012; ADB, 2015), the RE potential (Nguyen Ninh Hai, Dang Huy 
Cuong, & Pham Trong Thuc, 2015; Nguyen Ninh Hai et al., 2015; Asian Development Bank, 
2015b) and energy policies (Minh Do & Sharma, 2011; Khanh Toan, Minh Bao, & Ha Dieu, 
2011; UNDP, 2012a). Despite the research and governmental deployment targets, solar and 
wind power have a neglectable market share. 
The new de-risk approach has been applied on few case studies only. These are from Kenya, 
Mongolia, Panama and South Africa (UNDP et al., 2013). No country in South East Asia has 
been assessed on de-risking yet. By applying the de-risking approach on Vietnam, this thesis 
closes a knowledge gap. Having more information on ways to reduce RE investment risks in 
emerging economies could help to increase their deployment.  
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1.3 Aim & Objective & Research Questions 
This thesis aims to contribute to the diffusion of RE in emerging economies. With the case 
study of Vietnam, it intends to increase the deployment rate of large-scale RE projects in the 
country and in similar ones.  
The objective of this thesis is to present insights in reasons for slow deployment and how the 
de-risking approach can help to increase future deployment.  
This thesis analyses the contextual settings as well as current policies. It further provides 
information for strategic de-risking approaches that lower the costs of RE projects by decreasing 
investors’ risks.  
This thesis asks two questions: 
1. How conducive is Vietnam’s contextual setting to renewable energy investment?  
2. What are possible ways to de-risk renewable energy investments in Vietnam? 
1.4 Methodology  
This thesis starts with a literature review of barriers and risk as well as of different de-risking 
approaches for RE investments to get an understanding of the theoretical approach. De-risking 
instruments help to establish a good investment environment, that lower RE investments risks 
and consequently project costs.  
After the literature review (chapter 2) the methodology is presented in more detail in chapter 3. 
After that the case country Vietnam and its context are presented in chapter 4. That chapter 
presents data collected through desk research. The focus is on i) the current state of the power 
sector, including demand and supply, prices and actors ii) RE potential and iii) policies, laws and 
regulations that effect potential RE investors. Assessed sources are official governmental 
releases such as strategies and bills, research papers, publications of international organizations 
and newspaper articles.  
After presenting the country context an ex-post effectiveness analysis of the current RE policies 
is assessed. This is followed by an analysis of RE investment barriers and risks in Vietnam. For 
the analysis an analytical framework by the UNDP and Deutsche Bank was further developed 
(UNDP et al., 2013; Deutsche Bank et al., 2011). The literature on de-risking is relatively new 
and most studies use the analytical framework developed by these two organizations. However, 
during the literature review it occurred that the common analytical frameworks have 
shortcomings. The UNDP framework has an approach that is not user-friendly since it starts 
with the de-risking areas (policy, financial and direct financial incentives) instead of the the 
barriers. After identifying the area, options for de-risk instruments are given. However, the 
literature review on barriers and risks showed that RE investment barriers in emerging 
economies are diverse. This thesis classified the various barriers into five categories: technical 
barriers, political barriers, market barriers, informational barriers and administrative barriers. 
These new developed barrier categories build the foundation of the analytical framework of this 
thesis. Starting from the barrier categories, it is easy to find a specific barrier. From there it is 
possible to assign a de-risk instrument that allows the removal of a barrier or risk. This approach 
is problem-based instead of de-risk area/ instrument-based. It appears to be more practical since 
the question which de-risk area the chosen instrument belongs to is of secular importance for 
the removal of a barrier.  
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The foundation for the analysis was desk research and semi-structured interviews, that were 
conducted face-to-face. Most of the interviews were recorded (if the interviewee permitted). In 
one case an interviewee did not feel comfortable talking on the record. During the interviews 
the interviewer (author of this study) also took notes. After the interviews the author created 
documents with the main findings.  
Interview partners were 16 stakeholders working for organizations involved in foreign aid with 
a focal point on energy. These are for example the German Development Aid Agency 
“Gesellschaft für internationale Zusammenarbeit” (GIZ), Delegation of the European Union 
and the German Bank for Reconstruction “Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau” (KfW). The 
interviews were tailored to the specific expertise of the expert with the objective to find the 
main reasons for the slow progress of RE deployment in Vietnam and how to change it with a 
de-risk approach. The final step of this thesis is an ex-ante policy analysis with policy scenarios 
that contain different de-risk instruments, which can work as alternatives to current ones. Figure 
3 shows the four systematic steps of this thesis. The framework and research approach is 
explained in more details in chapter 3. 
 
Figure 3: Analytical Steps 
1.5 Scope and Limitations  
The thesis analysis the contextual settings for RE deployment and de-risking mechanisms in the 
case of the Social Republic of Vietnam. The thesis analyses the electricity sector in Vietnam and 
gives a detailed insight in the current RE situation within the country. It further shows barriers 
and ways on how to remove them. The findings could potentially also be relevant to countries 
that are similar to Vietnam. 
Technologies 
The assessed technologies in this thesis are wind power, and PV solar power. However, many 
of the findings are applicable for biomass and other large scale RE technologies too. In Vietnam 
a Because the hydropower sector in Vietnam is well developed already, research on further 
development is not urgently needed and is not part of this thesis. 
Limitations 
There were several limitations during the work on RE in Vietnam. First of all, there was a 
difficulty to access Vietnamese official institutions since an official formal invitation is needed 
for interviews with any employer of the state-owned enterprises (SOE) or ministries. In Vietnam 
it is more difficult to get access to information than in other countries. Vietnam is not a 
democracy, but a country with a single communist party that does not allow free speech. For 
that reason, the author predominantly conducted interviews among international organizations, 
based in Vietnam.  
1. Identify and 
describe country 
context 
2. Effectiveness 
analysis of 
current policies
3. Identify 
barriers and 
risks
4. Policy 
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An attempt to conduct interviews at a conference on RE in Vietnam was surprisingly 
unsuccessful: most participants (experts) did not have the required knowledge for answering 
questions or did not have high proficiency in English. The language barrier was another reason 
for conducting interviews mainly among international actors. Among the main actors that are 
involved in RE topics in Vietnam are several German organizations such as GIZ and KfW. For 
that reason, there is a higher share of interviewees from German organizations.  
1.6 Ethical Considerations 
A part of the research result is based on expert interviews. Before every interview several aspects 
were discussed with every of the interviewees. Firstly, the background and the research aim was 
explained and information about the research and the researcher’s background provided. After 
the first introduction several steps were followed: 
 Discussion of confidentiality of data  
 Discussion of anonymity and protection of data 
 Option of recording interview 
 
In some cases, the author also received printed or digital confidential data. In these cases, the 
use of sensible data was discussed too. Furthermore, the author approached the research 
questions unbiased and reflected on the results frequently. The policy recommendations are 
only based on the research results and the authors experiences.  
1.7 Audience  
The research will be valuable for several actors working on topics related to RE deployment in 
emerging economies and in Vietnam in particular. The targeted and intended audience are 
academic scholars, decision makers within and outside the government as well as consultants 
and international and intergovernmental organizations who aim to increase the share of RE with 
a de-risk approach.   
For researchers and potential investors who would like to have a quick overview of the 
Vietnamese market, the section “Vietnam Country Context” is of interest. For policy makers 
and consultants, the analysis, discussion and conclusion is of highest interest.  
1.8 Disposition 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
This chapter is an introduction into the topic and explains the connection between climate 
change and the energy sector, Vietnam’s power development, financial aspects of energy 
transition and energy challenges in emerging economies. It further gives basic information about 
the research endeavour such as research aim and research question. 
Chapter 2 –Literature Review  
This chapter is a literature review on how to make RE projects more competitive and attractive 
for private sector investors by using a de-risking approach. It analyses the available literature 
with the aim to develop a de-risking framework that will be applied to the case of Vietnam. It 
further presents barriers that RE investors currently face.  
Chapter 3 – Methodology  
This chapter gives an overview about the methodology applied in the thesis. It explains the 
evaluation background, the analytical framework and methods for data collection.  
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Chapter 4 – Vietnam’s Country Context  
This chapter is a systematic collection of renewable energy-related information in Vietnam and 
serves as a first step to get familiar with the country. The chapter gives an overview of Vietnam’s 
current state and presents the energy sector in detail with a focus on RE and aspects that are 
crucial for investors like the permitting process of RE projects. Furthermore, it describes 
energy-related policies. 
Chapter 5 – Analysis  
This chapter contains an ex-post effectiveness analysis of current RE policies and an ex-post 
analysis of investment barriers. It answers research question 1: How conducive is Vietnam’s 
contextual setting to renewable energy investment? and identifies RE investment barriers. 
Chapter 6 – Policy Scenarios  
This chapter in an ex-ante analysis that answers research question #2: What are possible ways to de-
risk renewable energy investments in Vietnam? Five policy scenarios were developed are presented. 
The scenarios work as alternatives to current policies. This section builds upon the findings of 
Chapter 5.  
Chapter 7 - Conclusion  
This chapter gives policy recommendation, shows the significance and impact of the research 
and indicates further research fields. 
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2 Literature Review 
This chapter is a literature review on how to make RE projects more competitive and attractive 
for private sector investors by using a de-risking approach. It analyses the available literature 
with the aim to develop a de-risking framework that will be applied to the case of Vietnam. It 
further presents barriers that RE investors currently face.  
The literature review provides information on ways of decreasing investment risks of RE 
projects. For answering research question 2: “What are possible ways to de-risk renewable energy 
investments in Vietnam?” it is important to understand the concept of de-risking thoroughly. 
Therefore, this chapter starts with background information on de-risking and explains the terms 
barriers and risks, which are crucial to understand to be able to identify them. It further explains 
different de-risking instruments. This knowledge is used to develop a policy mix of different de-
risking instruments to remove or lower the barriers and risks identified. The most successful 
de-risking instruments are called “cornerstone instruments”. Two of them, feed-in tariffs (FiT) 
and auctioning systems, are explained in detail.  
Background 
Even though RE technology is widely available today, the global energy transition is only slowly 
taking place. It is still expensive in many countries (T. Couture & Gagnon, 2010a) and in most 
developing countries it is therefore still financially more attractive for investors to invest in 
fossil-fuel power plants than in large-scale RE projects.  
A way to compare the actual costs of different electricity generating technologies is to do 
Levelized Costs of Electricity (LCOE) calculations, which allow comparing life-cycle generation 
costs of different electricity generating technologies. To obtain the LCOE of a given technology 
the total cost over lifetime is divided by the electricity produced over lifetime. It unveils, that 
RE technologies have high upfront costs and (very) low to almost no running costs. On the 
other hand, high carbon energy generation projects are less capital intensive but have operating 
costs that are depending on fuel prices.  
A large part of the high upfront costs of RE projects strives from risks, RE project developers 
face. The potential of cost reduction is immense and can be achieved by reducing risks, which 
consequently decrease financial costs since banks ask for lower interest rates or smaller shares 
for private equity. Waissbein states in a UNDP report from 2013, that investors can be attracted 
by: “reducing risks or by providing a financial incentive” (UNDP et al., 2013, p.31). The United 
Nations Secretary General’s Advisory Group on Energy and Climate Change (AGECC) 
together with the Deutsche Bank Climate Change Advisors (DBCCA) worked out new ways to 
foster RE investments in developing countries, since they are currently more expensive than in 
industrial states (Deutsche Bank et al., 2011).  
Wind energy projects for example are on average 40% more expensive in developing countries 
than in industrialized nations, due to the higher costs of equity and debt (UNDP et al., 2013). 
Paradoxically in the last decade large-scale RE projects did not get notably cheaper in most 
developing countries but in industrial states. Even though the costs for technologies did 
decrease, the financing costs stayed the same or increased because of higher (perceived) risks. 
The published report by the UNDP stresses these differences between industrial and developing 
countries and highlights that RE support instruments have to be country-specific.  
In a further step the Deutsche Bank Group started a research partnership with the UNDP and 
developed a “de-risking” approach with the goal to establish a favourable investment 
environment for RE projects (UNDP et al., 2013; Deutsche Bank et al., 2011). Even though the 
Windy Times in Emerging Economies 
11 
term “de-risking” is new, the approach is not. In the financial sector there has always been risk 
management with the aim to minimize risks. However, for the first time a de-risking approach 
was developed with the specific goal to make large-scale RE projects more economical.  
Since the approach is new there is still little literature on it (Deutsche Bank et al., 2011; Frisari 
& Valerio, 2015; Schmidt, 2014; UNDP et al., 2013, 2013). A de-risking framework for policy 
makers developed by the UNDP was only applied in a few countries so far: in Kenya, Mongolia, 
Panama and South Africa but in no South East Asian country(UNDP et al., 2013).  
2.1 Barriers and Risks  
This section has a closer look at barriers and risks RE project developers face in developing 
countries and early stage RE markets. The literature review will help to better understand and 
identify barriers and risks. Compared to the literature on de-risking, there is more literature on 
barriers available (Beck & Martinot, 2004; Painuly, 2001; Verbruggen et al., 2010). However, the 
literature is not consistent, nor is there are simple way to apply it in analysis due to the amount 
of barrier described. This section combines the work of different authors and makes their 
approaches more applicable.     
The definition of “risk” is: “the possibility that something unpleasant or unwelcome will 
happen” (Oxford Dictionary, 2016, p. n.a.). For example a policy risk occurs if there is the 
possibility that a national government changes policies in a way that the financial stability of an 
investment is not given any more (Micale, Frisari, Hervé-Mignucci, & Mazza, 2013). Risks are a 
result of barriers. That specific policy risk would originate from a political barrier. Barriers are 
man-made and “can be overcome or attenuated by a policy, programme, or measure“ 
(Verbruggen et al., 2010, p.852). Verbruggen further says that they are contextual and dynamic, 
like potentials, and have to be analysed in every country-case specifically. In the energy sector 
barriers “are often deeply embedded, reflecting long-held practices centred on fossil-fuels and 
monopolistic market structures” (UNDP et al., 2013,  p.24).  
In the literature on barriers, it can be noticed that different authors have found similar RE 
investment barriers. However, different authors have named and categorized them differently 
(see table 1) (Verbruggen et al., 2010; Deutsche Bank et al., 2011; Painuly, 2001; Beck & 
Martinot, 2004). For example “lack of information” is considered a “market-related barrier” by 
the UNEP, while it is an ”informational barrier” in the UNDP report (UNEP, 2004; UNDP et 
al., 2013). Another example is “Access to finance”, which can be a market-related barrier, a 
political, institutional or even informational barrier, depending on the author. The different 
categorization of barriers and risks can also be noticed by comparing the UNDP report to other 
literature. The report states: “barriers related to policymakers, which concern policies and 
regulation of power markets, can be grouped into a risk category called ‘power market risk’“ 
(UNDP et al., 2013, p. 48). Other authors would put policy related barriers into “institutional 
barriers” (Painuly, 2001), “legal and regulatory barriers” (Beck & Martinot, 2004) and “political 
instability” (Deutsche Bank et al., 2011). There are also some cross cutting issues. For example 
the UNEP report (2004) states that political barriers are “associated with regulatory and policy 
issues and governmental leadership” while market barriers are “associated with (a) lack of 
financial, legal and institutional frameworks” (UNEP, 2004). This example shows that “market 
barriers” are partly “political barriers” since it is arguable that institutional frameworks are 
shaped by governments.  
Analysing the literature showed that there is no literature-wide coherence in the categorization 
of barriers. Instead there are different categories depending on the author and the variety of 
categories makes it difficult to use them. To make the information operational for succeeding 
chapters and to reduce the number of groups, the author has divided the barriers into five 
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thematic groups, depending on the content of the barrier. The new groups contain related 
barriers found in literature. Some of them are merged to simplify the work. For example the 
barriers: financial barriers (UNDP et al., 2013), market barriers (UNEP, 2004), market failure/ 
imperfection, market distortions, economic and financial barriers (Painuly, 2001), cost and 
pricing barriers (Beck & Martinot, 2004), access to finance and import tariffs (Deutsche Bank 
et al., 2011) are all covered in the barrier category market related barriers. In table 1 all categories 
and barriers are explained. The five barrier categories are: market-related barriers, political 
barriers, administrative barriers, informational barriers and technical barriers. In the following 
section each of them will be defined.  
Table 1: Barriers Found in Literature 
Category UNDP (2013) UNEP (2004) Painuli (2001) Beck (2004) 
Deutsche Bank 
(2011) 
Market Related 
Barriers 
Financial Barriers Market Barriers 
Market 
Failure/Imperfection 
Cost and 
Pricing Barriers 
Access to finance 
Market Distortions 
Import tariffs Economic and Financial 
Barriers 
Political Barriers 
Regulatory 
Barriers 
Political 
Barriers 
Institutional Barriers 
Legal and 
Regulatory 
Barriers 
Political 
instability 
Administrative 
Barriers 
Administrative 
Barriers 
   
Administrative 
barriers 
Land title 
uncertainties 
Informational 
Barrier 
Informational 
Barriers 
Analytical 
Barriers Social, Cultural and 
Behavioural 
 
Lack of technical 
skills Cognitive 
Barriers 
Technical 
Barriers 
Technical 
Barriers 
 Technical Barriers   
Source: (Beck & Martinot, 2004; Deutsche Bank et al., 2011; Painuly, 2001; UNDP et al., 2013; 
UNEP, 2004) 
 
Market Related Barriers 
Market-related barriers are those related to the market in a broader sense. Financial barriers 
(UNDP et al., 2013), access to finance (Deutsche Bank et al., 2011), cost and pricing (Beck & 
Martinot, 2004) as well as market failure/ imperfection (Painuly, 2001). Examples for market 
related barriers are a controlled energy sector with no or only little competition (UNDP et al., 
2013; Painuly, 2001), subsidies for fossil fuels, no/little or difficult access to capital (Painuly, 
2001).  
 
Political Barriers 
Political barriers are barriers related to regulatory and policy issues and missing “governmental 
leadership” (UNEP, 2004). The government sets an institutional/ regulatory framework 
investors base their business plans on. Therefore, a government has to be reliable and 
trustworthy when it comes to regulations. Investors seek investment stability and look for 
countries with official (governmental) RE strategies and targets that give planning security (UNDP 
et al., 2013).  
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A Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) coupled with a Feed-in Tariff (FiT) is a crucial policy 
instrument for the support of RE deployment. A missing or poorly designed PPA and/or tendering 
procedures is a barrier. If a government cannot secure a PPA over the contracted time, it is a risk 
for investors (Deutsche Bank et al., 2011; UNDP et al., 2013).  
Administrative Barriers 
The administrative body of a country puts regulations into place and carries them out. If the 
administration does not work effectively, it results in risks for investors. Possible shortcomings 
in the administration related to RE investments are complex and time consuming licensing and 
permitting processes (UNDP et al., 2013), bad or no communication among different actors 
(Painuly, 2001), different interests among actors, little or no research and development (R&D), 
no professionalism in public institutions, no institutions that diffuse information and corruption 
(UNEP, 2004). 
Furthermore, in new markets, different actors still have to learn how to work together 
efficiently. Actors such as national institutions, businesses, networks and investors will go 
through a learning process that takes time (learning by interacting). While interacting is still time-
consuming at the beginning, it can become faster and more efficient overtime.  
Informational Barriers 
Informational barriers go back to “quality and availability of information” (UNEP, 2004, p. 16). 
For example, if there is no information on wind speed or the information available is of poor 
quality, it is a barrier for potential investors. Informational barriers can also mean a lack of 
awareness and can result in denial of RE technology among the people (Painuly, 2001). 
Literature calls this little or no “social acceptance” (UNEP, 2004). An example is “Not In My 
Back Yard” (NIMBY) initiatives of people who don’t want to live close to RE projects 
(Burningham, Barnett, & Walker, 2015; Devine-Wright, 2014). Informational barriers can also 
mean a lack of skilled labour, a lack of Operation and Maintenance (O&M) skills or 
entrepreneurs (UNDP et al., 2013).  
Technical Barriers 
Technical barriers are barriers that arise because of technical drawbacks. They for example occur 
if there are different standards or no standards for RE projects, electricity transmission or 
feeding in electricity (Painuly, 2001). They also appear if an energy system cannot cope with 
volatile energy supply.  
2.2 De-Risking 
In the last section of this thesis several RE investment barriers and risks were explained. This 
section focuses on an approach to lower risks and remove barriers in order to make RE 
investments more attractive. It is called the de-risking approach  
As seen in the literature on barriers, there are several categories with different barriers. To 
remove more than one barrier, a mix of different de-risk instruments has to be implemented. 
In policy making it is known that a single instrument cannot overcome all barriers (Tinbergen, 
1952). The task of policymakers is to analyse barriers in a first step and to decide what policy 
instruments can be used to remove them (Verbruggen et al., 2010).  
The UNDP has divided de-risk instruments into three different de-risk areas: policy de-risking, 
financial de-risking and direct financial incentives. Figure 4 shows the de-risk areas and the 
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associated instruments found in literature. In the next section, the most commonly used ones 
are explained. 
 
Figure 4: Most Commonly Used De-Risking Instruments 
Source: (Beck & Martinot, 2004; Deutsche Bank et al., 2011; Painuly, 2001; UNDP et al., 2013; UNEP, 
2004) 
Policy De-Risking 
Policy de-risking tools aim to smoothen processes and remedy underlying barriers (Beck & 
Martinot, 2004; Deutsche Bank et al., 2011; Painuly, 2001; UNDP et al., 2013; UNEP, 2004). 
They go to the root cause of investment risks and try to remove it. In this section the most used 
policy de-risking instruments are presented. 
In general, policy de-risking instruments are more complex than other de-risking options like 
financial de-risking. Furthermore, they start lowering risks with a delay since it takes time to 
achieve structural changes and to change processes as well as behaviours. After the 
implementation, it also takes time to build up trust and make stakeholders such as banks and 
investors acknowledge the changes (UNDP et al., 2013). However, because policy de-risking 
allows taking a barrier/ risk away permanently, it is more cost-efficient than financial de-risking. 
That means that money for this de-risking approach has to be spent only once while many can 
profit from the change. Especially for developing countries this is an important fact since it 
prevents them from long-term dependency of international donors.  
A prominent example of policy de-risking is to improve the process of obtaining permits and 
approvals for RE projects. In many cases the procedures are cumbersome and it happens that 
De-Risk Area
Policy
Streamline and Simplify 
Permitting Process
Long-term RE Targets
Access to Reliable 
Information
Communicating 
Responsibilities 
Trainings for Staff
Improve O&M Skills
Financial
Public Loans/ Soft Loans
Loan Guarantees
Political Risk Insurances
Gap Funding
Public Equity Co-Investments
Direct Financial
Power Purchase Agreements 
(PPA)
Feed-in Tariff (FiT)
Price Premium
Tax Credits
Carbon Offset
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several permits have to be obtained from different institutions before a developer is allowed to 
carry out a project. The responsibilities among the institutions are neither obvious, nor clear-
cut. Every time a developer has to obtain a permit, there is a risk that problems occur, which 
lead to delays in the development and construction of projects. Since delays are expensive, even 
the risk of having one increases the financing costs. In order to reduce the risks for investors a 
streamlined and simplified permitting process can be introduced. This approach consists of reducing 
the number of actors in the permitting process, communicating responsibilities of different actors 
clearly and providing trainings for staff working on the permitting processes in the public sector.  
There are several additional policy de-risking approaches that can be applied. For example, 
improving investors’ confidence can be achieved by establishing long-term renewable energy targets. 
This gives investors certainty that the government takes RE deployment seriously and commits 
its resources for many years.  
A lack of fundamental investment information makes it impossible to make knowledgeable 
investment decisions. Since decisions that are not based on knowledge/ information bear high 
risks it is crucial to assure the availability of RE related information and data for investor (e.g. 
wind speed measurements or data on sun hours). The access to reliable information helps to reduce 
risks since developers do not need to spend much time on acquiring information and the 
information is officially proven and reliable.  
The possibility to hire skilled labour is essential for every investor, while the absence of it is a 
burden of risk. For example, if the energy system experiences disruptions and no experienced 
personal can be found, it can cause long operational stops. In the worst case expensive experts 
from outside the country have to fly in to repair and operate the system. To avoid that situation, 
technical assistance and trainings for local staff (improved O&M skills) is essential.  
Financial De-Risking 
This section explains the financial de-risking approach. The difference between policy and 
financial de-risking instruments is that financial de-risking does not aim to change the underlying 
barriers (Schmidt, 2014; Micale et al., 2013). Instead it shifts risks from the private investor to 
public actors, such as governments and ministries, bilateral aid agencies, export credit agencies 
and Development Financial Institutions (DFI).  
Shifting the risks leads to an almost immediate decrease of risks for the private investor and 
consequently lowers interest rates (UNEP, 2004; Climate Policy Initiative, 2015; Climate Policy 
Initiative, 2014). There are several financial de-risking instruments policy makers can choose 
from. In the following section the most used ones are presented. There are public loans/ soft 
loans, loan guarantees, political risk insurances, gap funding and public equity co-investments. 
Public loans/ soft loans are usually loans with a lower interest rate and longer repayment period 
than commercial ones. They can be specifically designed for sustainable or even RE projects. 
Limited and unlimited loan guarantees are another way of financial de-risking. A public actor, for 
example the government assures a bank to pay for a loan (partially/fully) if an investor fails to 
do so. This can happen if a contract partner such as a power utility breaks a contract and does 
not buy electricity anymore.  Loan guarantees increase the security for banking institutes and 
therewith decreases the interest rate. Political risk insurances help investors to lower risks in 
countries with instable political systems and in those with volatile policies. The insurances cover 
various risks such as currency exchange losses, governmental expropriation and changes due to 
wars and revolutions. Most typical political risks covered are changing policies that lead to losses 
like breaking a PPA or FiT contract (Polzin, Migendt, Täube, & von Flotow, 2015). Gap funding 
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and public equity co-investment are two financial de-risk approaches that involve public actors 
directly into an investment. Gap funding is used to close a financial gap. In this case a public actor 
can cover it to make an investment viable. If a public actor de-risks an investment with a public 
equity co-investment the public entity becomes a (minority) co-investor.  
Direct Financial Incentives 
Policy de-risk instruments try to take away barriers, while financial de-risking instruments shift 
the risk from a private investor to a public actor. However, there are also some barriers that 
cannot be taken away, nor shifted to another actor. For these cases there are direct financial 
incentives that incentivise investors to invest even if there are still risks and barriers remaining 
(Micale et al., 2013).  
Due to learning effects, it is usually significantly cheaper to support RE technologies at the 
beginning than supporting them half-hearted over a long time (UNEP, 2004). Once the costs 
of RE deployment decrease, (direct financial) de-risking instruments can decrease too. That 
makes it cheaper to install more RE capacity and to reach RE targets.  
Waissbein et al. (2013) argue that FiT is both a policy and a financial de-risk instrument (UNDP 
et al., 2013). In this thesis they are categorized as direct financial incentives because investors 
directly receive money for generated electricity. The cornerstone instruments Power Purchase 
Agreements (PPA), Feed-in Tariff (FiT) and Price Premium are shortly explained in this section and 
in more detail in the next section (cornerstone instruments).  
Tax credits help investors to spend less money on their equipment. In some countries there are 
tax exemptions for all products and instruments related to RE projects. Tax credits can also mean 
that the company developing a project and selling electricity after the development does not 
have to pay income or corporate tax. Carbon offset is an additional way for RE project developers 
to earn money. By selling carbon offset certificates developers can diversify their incomes. That 
way their income does not entirely rely on selling electricity, which reduces risks. A Power Purchase 
Agreement (PPA) is a contract between the seller (generator) and the buyer (power utility/ 
network provider) of electricity. It is a mechanism that guarantees, that generated electricity will 
be purchased at a fixed price for a certain amount of time. Furthermore, it declares that the 
seller has access to the electricity grid. A contract is usually signed for a period of 10-20 years. 
A Feed-in Tariff (FiT) is a special tariff for electricity generated in RE plants. The electricity seller 
receives a certain amount of money for every kWh sold. Because the remuneration is pre-set 
and does not depend on the market, it is called a market-independent remuneration. The FiT 
can either be set by a regulator or can be the result of an auctioning system (the differences are 
described in the section “Cornerstone Instruments”). On the other hand, a Price Premium is a 
market-dependent support instrument. A seller receives a certain amount of money per kWh 
on top of the average spot market. Because the amount of money a project developer receives 
per kWh depends on the market prices, it is called a market depended remuneration.  
Cornerstone Instruments 
Cornerstone instruments are the base of a well-designed support scheme (del Río, 2012; UNDP 
et al., 2013). They focus on the main investment risks and build the foundation for a whole 
policy de-risking mix that also includes other policy and financial de-risking instruments 
(Deutsche Bank et al., 2011). There is evidence that some instruments were more successful in 
achieving high deployment rates than others. The most successful ones are called cornerstone 
instruments and they help investors to feel more confident about RE investments. Del Rio 
(2014) calls cornerstone instruments primary instruments and other instruments (tax reduction, 
soft loans, subsidies etc.) secondary instruments, which further highlights the importance of 
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“cornerstone” instruments. The most often-used cornerstone instrument is a feed-in-tariff 
scheme that couples a fixed price with a PPA long-term contract. Other cornerstone 
instruments are quotas, net metering and auctions.  
This section presents two successfully used cornerstone instruments in detail, FiTs and auctions. 
Knowing different instruments and their design options helps to choose the right instrument 
for a specific country. Del Río points out that the right design of an instrument is as important 
as the choice of the instrument itself (del Río, 2012). 
Feed-in Tariffs 
Feed-in-tariff schemes are the most successful and most widely used instrument to support RE 
deployment worldwide (Kongnam & Nuchprayoon, 2009a). The European Union (EU) states 
that “well-adapted feed-in tariff regimes are generally the most efficient and effective support 
schemes for promoting renewable electricity” (European Commission, 2008, p. 1). Germany’s 
success in the fast deployment of RE is highly based on support mechanisms with a FiT scheme 
as a cornerstone instrument (Kongnam & Nuchprayoon, 2009b; Butler & Neuhoff, 2008; 
Jacobsson & Lauber, 2006). In 2015, the country had a RE share in its electricity mix of 32.5% 
(Resch et al., 2006). Today, alone in the EU there are 23 countries using feed-in laws (Agora 
Energiewende, 2016; REN21, 2015). A total of 108 states have implemented a FiT on national 
or provincial level.  
FiTs are a fixed price per kWh for generated electricity from RE, coupled with a long-term 
contract (PPA). The contract is between RE project developers (electricity sellers) and electricity 
buyers (del Río & Linares, 2014). Instead of paying the normal price per kWh, developers of 
RE projects receive a higher remuneration, that is closer to the cost of generation. Depending 
on the technology (wind, solar, biomass etc.) and the region, the set price can vary.  
Advantages 
FiT schemes give a high level of investment security to investors of RE projects due to long-
term contracts, cash flows, and transparent remuneration. Because of a steadily growing market, 
often manufacturers start setting up factories too, which creates jobs in the country that 
implements a FiT (Aguirre & Ibikunle, 2014; T. Couture & Gagnon, 2010b). Another advantage 
is, that money is only transferred to already electricity generating projects. Therefore no money 
“gets lost” on unsuccessfully developed projects (T. D. Couture, Cory, Kreycik, & Williams, 
2010). Since different prices can be set for different technologies, immature technologies can 
be supported too. Furthermore, it is possible to adjust FiT over time and once project 
development gets cheaper, the remuneration for new projects can decrease too. 
Disadvantages 
FiT schemes also carry disadvantages. Some of them go back to the price-setting process of FIT 
(Moner-Girona, 2009; T. Couture & Gagnon, 2010b). Governmental officials set the price 
without involvement of developers, which makes it difficult to set “the right” tariff and does 
not allow (price) competition among investors/ developers. Therefore, FiT can be set too high 
or too low. Furthermore, it is difficult for policy makers to know how much the total policy 
support will cost.  
An example of a FiT that was set too high could be seen in Spain (T. D. Couture et al., 2010; 
Delrio & Unruh, 2007). The FiT attracted many developers and the share of RE increased. The 
government missed the chance to adjust the tariffs fast enough. Consequently, the costs for 
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electricity surged, which led to decreasing public support. Ultimately, the possibility of changing 
policies made developers worry about their investments.  
Design  
As mentioned above, there are different design options for FiTs. For example, policy makers 
have to consider who pays for the support mechanism and how to set it up. The costs can either 
be covered by the government or by consumers. The tariff can be market-independent or 
market-dependent. While the monetary questions (who pays/ how much) are of high 
importance, the general design of FiT is crucial too. The main difference between the two 
models is that market independent FiTs offer a fixed price for electricity from renewable energy 
systems (RES) while market dependent FiT fluctuate as much as the market does. Both design 
aspects -who pays for it and how to set up a tariff system- are discussed in the following section 
“Government” and “Consumers”.  
Government  
The government has the option to allocate a certain amount of the state’s budget for the support 
of renewable energies. FiT paid by the government do not impact the electricity tariff and 
therewith assures industrial competitiveness. It might make it also easier to achieve and keep 
public support, since consumers do not directly see a connection between higher shares of RE 
and higher costs. 
However, if the government covers the costs, there are several risks too. There is the possibility 
that the allocated budget is exhausted after a time of high RE deployment. That happens, if the 
support policy is “too” successful and results in a high deployment rate, which could mean the 
end of the policy with devastating consequences for investors. Another risk is that an initially 
allocated budget does not get renewed due to elections or other political circumstances.  
Consumers 
The second option is that consumers pay a RE levy on top of their electricity price. If the 
support policy works well and leads to higher deployment rates, consumers (private and 
industry) have to pay more for their electricity consumption. For industrial actors that can result 
in negative impacts on their global competiveness. However, industrial exemptions can be 
granted. The fact that customers carry the costs has positive and negative aspects for investors. 
It can higher and lower their risks: higher consumer prices can be a risk for investors, if 
consumers start to complain about the price. The moment consumers are unhappy about price 
developments the financing model becomes a risk. Governments might start to react because 
of their complains and change the FiT model. However, developers do not have to fear that an 
allocated budget does not get renewed or gets exhausted. An advantage of this model is that 
consumers know exactly what their money is spend on, instead of paying tax into a “black box”.  
Market-independent FiT 
In this section, the most common market-independent (fixed price model) and market-dependent 
(premium price models) support designs are presented. The design options for market-independent 
are the front-end loaded tariff model and the fixed price model with inflation adjustment. The options 
presented for market-dependent FiTs are the variable premium FiT policy design and the percentage of 
the retail price model. 
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The most basic way to design a FiT is to set a fixed price model with a set price that is not linked 
to the market price of electricity. It is a minimum price with an assurance over a certain period 
of time (usually between 10-20 years). Since the price does not change, the remuneration can be 
calculated before the investment is carried out, which assures high investment security. That 
also makes RE investments more attractive for risk-adverse small-scale investors and for the 
support of immature technologies. However, that also means that there is no incentive for 
project developers/ operators to link the electricity generation to the demand (market 
independent) which can negatively impact the electricity market and grid stability. 
The standard fixed price model does not take any market changes into account. However, 
inflation can be a risk factor and for this reason, there is another model called fixed price model 
with inflation adjustment. The price usually gets adjusted annually or quarterly, which assures 
investors to also receive a high remuneration towards the end of a project and therefore offers 
high security, especially in countries with high inflation. If the premium does not get adjusted 
to the inflation the real value of the premium declines. For policy makers it might be easier to 
get public support for this model due to lower initial costs. In some countries with high inflation 
the support scheme is not linked to the local currency but to the US$ instead, which assures low 
inflation.  
The opposite model is a front-end loaded tariff model. This model starts with higher remuneration 
that decrease incrementally over time. Usually there is a higher tariff for the first 10 years and a 
lower one for the next 10 years. Since investors usually depend on loans and equity, they have 
a high interest in paying them back as fast as possible. Higher FiT in the beginning helps them 
to do so. After loans are payed back, the real costs for developers are also lower since they 
mainly consist of operational costs. Therefore, the front-end loaded tariff model reflects the declining 
project costs. This allows developers to receive higher net profits hence interests are paid back 
faster while the total received premium is the same as in a fixed price model.  
Market-dependent FiT 
Market-dependent FiTs (also called premium price models) offer a premium payment that is given 
on top of the regular market price. In this model the electricity generated from RES is sold on 
the (spot) market and has to compete with the electricity from regular energy sources. For this 
reason, there is usually no power-purchase agreement that could lower risks. On top of the spot 
market price, the supplier receives a premium. However, the regular market price usually 
fluctuates and can be positively and negatively influenced by market changes such as global oil 
or gas price developments and electricity demand & supply changes. Since it is hard to predict 
such changes for an investment period (10-20 years), market-dependent FiT tends to contain 
higher uncertainties. However, it can also have positive results: A market dependent FiT 
encourages electricity suppliers to generate electricity when it is most needed (prices are highest) 
and thereby helps to create grid stability. However, this is only possible with biomass and 
hydropower, which can easily be regulated. Furthermore, studies show that the higher 
uncertainties are reflected in higher remuneration. Premium Price Models tend to have higher 
total costs than market independent FIT (del Río & Mir-Artigues, 2012).  
Basic premium price models contain high uncertainties for developers as well as for the party that 
pays since market prices are not foreseeable and can sky rock as much as descent. An option to 
lower the risks for both is to install a cap or a floor. This model is called a variable premium FiT 
policy design. It makes sure that developers receive a minimum amount of money, which increases 
their investment security. However, if the price on the spot market reaches a certain retail price, 
the premium is not paid anymore. It serves as a floor that does not let the price sky rock, nor 
to crash.  
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Another market-dependent model is the percentage of the retail price model. The model also depends 
on the market price for electricity. However, it assures developers an additional fixed percentage 
of the retail price on top of the retail price. For example, in the 1990s when Germany still used 
this model RE developers received 90% of the retail price for electricity generated by wind and 
solar. 
Auctioning System 
Another cornerstone instrument to support RE deployment are auctioning systems. Just 
recently a trend to implement more auctioning systems began worldwide. In 2005 auctioning 
systems were used in six countries only, in 2009 in 21 countries already and in 2015 the number 
increase to at least 60 (IRENA, 2015a); (IRENA, 2015). Figure 5 shows the countries that 
introduced a RE auctioning systems by 2015 (in blue). It can be seen that the application of 
auctioning systems is not limited to one geographical region but that auctioning systems are 
used all over the world. However, there are also a few examples of countries that changed from 
an auctioning system to a FiT such as Ireland, China and the United Kingdom (UK) have 
changed their support mechanisms from auctioning schemes to FiTs, there are also examples 
of countries that change the other way around.  
 
Figure 5: Countries with RE Auctioning Systems 
Source: (IRENA, 2015a) 
Key for a successful auctioning system is to design it according to the local needs and 
circumstances. If this is done, it can be an highly efficient and effective instrument for 
supporting RE deployment (IRENA, 2015); (del Río & Linares, 2014).  
This chapter explains the instrument, its functioning and describes advantages and 
disadvantages of it. Additionally, it describes the central design aspects for policy makers. In 
particular, it gives options on the bidding process, the price setting and possible penalties for project 
developers.  
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Functioning 
If a government decides to use auctioning systems as a cornerstone instrument for RE support, 
the authority calls for tenders (IRENA, 2015a). The bidding process starts for a certain capacity 
(in MW) or generated electricity (in kWh) of RE projects in (usually) a set area. It follows a 
bidding process among project developers who submit a price per MW/ kWh they can develop 
a project for. The authority evaluates the bids and nominates the winning developer, which is 
the one with the lowest price bid per MW/ kWh. The winning project then can be supported 
via a FIT, a premium price model, investment grants or a one-time support that reflects the bid.  
Advantages  
In an auctioning scheme developers are included in the price-finding process through their bids 
(IRENA, 2015). They show how much money they plan to spend per MW/kWh. The 
competition among developers lowers the price and the price setting in auction systems is 
therefore transparent and usually close to the real costs. Studies have shown that auctions on 
average are more cost-efficient than other support schemes like normal FiTs.  
Every auction is for a specific project of a specific size, calculated in MW. Through that setting 
the government knows exactly how much money it will spend. Sudden electricity price hikes 
cannot happen in such a system. At the same time the government also knows that previously 
set deployment targets will be achieved since they offer support for exactly the capacity that is 
needed. Another advantage is on the legal side: it is a contract between two parties that shows 
commitment from both sites. Project developers therefore have higher regulatory certainty; 
hence they don’t have to worry about policy changes or a change of remuneration. Similar to 
other support schemes, the price per kWh usually decreases after a couple of successfully 
implemented projects due to learning effects.  
Disadvantages 
Before developers can bid, they have to calculate the expected costs, which increases the upfront 
planning and drives up the transaction costs. The higher initial barriers can lead to an exclusion 
from the bidding process of smaller developers. In some cases, this can lead to a bidding process 
with few participants, which can lead to a higher price. If the higher a priori costs are passed on 
to the final bid price the instrument can be more expensive than a different support instrument 
(like a FiT). Another potential issue is “underbidding”, which means that developers submit a 
bid that is too low to cover their expected costs. Even though they win the auction with the 
lowest bid, they won’t start carrying out a RE project, since their income per MWh wouldn’t 
cover their expenses. Underbidding can be an even bigger concern if state owned enterprises 
(SOE) are involved in the bidding process. Cases from China have shown that especially SOEs 
tend to underbid since they can easily deal with deficits for some time. Strategic underbidding 
can happen, if developers wait until technologies get cheaper.  
Another disadvantage mentioned in literature is the unlikeliness of building up a proper 
manufacturing industry for RE technologies. Most countries that use an auctioning system do 
not have national RE technology manufacturing, but mainly import technology from abroad. 
Another aspect to consider is that auctions usually promote technologies that are already mature. 
New technologies are generally not supported by auctioning systems.  
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Design 
The design of any policy instrument is crucial. Therefore, this part of the thesis shows different 
design aspects that should be considered and applied if an auctioning system is used. Following, 
the bidding process, price setting options and possible penalties for project developers are explained.  
Bidding 
A bidding price that is clearly defined and communicated to all parties involved is essential. The 
number of bidding rounds as well as the time between the rounds has to be communicated in 
advance. The breaks between the rounds should not be too long to avoid bidding processes that 
take several years.  
There should be a minimum number of bidders for every auction in order to have some 
competition that decreases the final price. Another way to avoid exaggerated bids is to set a 
maximum price. If that price is exceeded, the auction can be cancelled (for example, Denmark 
did this for offshore wind power projects). There are two bidding system options: 
a) Sealed-bid: Bidders only know their own bid 
b) Descending-clock auction: bidders know other bids too 
 
Del Rio (2014) suggests that a good design is a mix out of the two bidding designs (del Río & 
Linares, 2014). In the beginning bidders should know about other bids in order to get an idea 
about the prices. Later on, the bidding should be sealed. 
Price Setting 
There are several ways of setting a support level for developers who won an auction: 
c) Uniform Pricing: The last bid sets the price for all bidders/ winners 
d) Pay as bid: The winning developers receive the price they submitted 
e) Vichrey: The winner receives the price of the bid of the second, the second of the third 
etc.  
f) Median: The median of the bids sets the price for all winners 
 
Furthermore, the guaranteed support time has to be set in advance. Depending on the length, 
auctions can become more or less attractive. If a developer wins a project, a 10-20 years’ contract 
is usually signed between the project developer and the entity that purchases the electricity. The 
support period has to be clear and should not be too short. A short period inclines the price per 
kWh, a lower price per kWh is achieved by longer support periods.  
The remuneration model has to be chosen too. It can either be a feed-in premium (in 
US$/MWh) or a capacity payment (US$ per MW and year). A capacity payment is comparable 
to an investment grant that is paid over the length of the contract. Worldwide, there are more 
projects that are supported by a feed-in premium (del Río & Linares, 2014).  
Penalties 
As described in the section “disadvantages” developers can win an auction with an offer that is 
too low and would not cover the costs. Developers will therefore no start carrying out the won 
project. To avoid that, there should be a penalty that avoids project hold-ups. There are different 
options to design a penalty scheme. It can either be:  
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a) a fixed amount of money 
per MW / MWh/ linked to the investment sum 
b) a price increasing over the time of the delay 
e.g. a fixed amount per month  
 
The amount of money should not be too high, since developers might get discouraged to bid at 
all. However, it should not be too low either since developers would not care about the penalty 
at all in that case. Additionally, there should be a penalty for developers who entirely fail to 
develop a project. A deadline for starting constructing a project should be put in place, too. The 
time between winning an auction and starting to build a project should not be too long. Del Rio 
and Linares suggest to further set a deadline for the completion of the project (Ragwitz et al., 
2014). A short deadline is preferred, since it avoids underbidding (over optimisms about price 
developments). However, there can also be delays due to external factors. Often developers 
have to wait for a permit. Therefore, there should be a penalty exception for delays caused by 
official authorities.  
2.3 Summary Cornerstone Instruments 
The two cornerstone instruments presented, the feed-in tariff and the auctioning system have 
advantages and disadvantages. This section helped to understand different design options. 
Knowing differences help to choose the right instrument for a specific country context. Table 
2 show the advantages and disadvantages of auctioning systems and FiT.  
Table 2: Advantages & Disadvantages of Auctioning Systems and FiT 
Auctioning System Feed-in Tariff 
Advantages Disadvantages Advantages Disadvantages 
Inclusion of developers in 
price finding 
High transaction costs High level of investment 
security 
Price setting insecure 
(overcompensation 
possible) 
Transparent price setting High initial barriers for 
developers 
Long term contracts Can lead to increased 
electricity prices 
Cost efficient Can reduce competition 
and increase price 
Transparent remuneration Difficult to know total 
policy costs 
Good plannability of 
expenses 
Possibility of 
underbidding 
Job creation in 
manufacturing 
No price competition 
Good plannability of 
deployment rate 
Less likely to attract 
manufacturers 
No support of 
unsuccessful project 
High initial investment 
not addressed 
High regulatory certainty 
for developers 
Mainly support of mature 
technologies 
Possible to support 
immature technologies 
 
  Option of adjusting tariffs  
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter gave an overview about risks and barriers for large-scale RE investments. 
Especially in developing countries there are many investment barriers and risks that drive up 
the project costs. The chapter described barriers found in literature and categorized them in five 
groups: market related barriers, political barriers, administrative barriers, informational barriers, 
and technical barriers.  
The chapter further explained ways of removing barriers. This can be achieved by applying a 
policy mix with de-risking instruments from three de-risking categories: policy de-risking 
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(removing a barrier), financial de-risking (shifting a barrier from a private to a public actor) and 
direct financial de-risking (incentivising investors despite of barriers). 
The most successful instruments (cornerstone instruments), feed-in tariffs and auctioning 
systems were explained in detail. They have helped to increase the RE deployment rate in many 
countries worldwide. Depending on the country context, auctions or FIT can be the more 
promising instrument. This chapter showed design option and advantages as well as 
disadvantages of the instruments. It furthermore provides information for policymakers to 
analyse barriers and to decide what policy mix can work to remove barriers and risks. 
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3 Methodology 
This chapter gives an overview about the methodology applied in the thesis. It explains the 
evaluation background, the analytical framework and methods for data collection.  
This thesis analyses Vietnam as a case for de-risking RE investment by using an ex-post and an 
ex-ante analysis. In this section the research method and the analytical framework to identify 
barriers and risks and to remove them is presented and explained. This chapter starts with 
background information on policy evaluation in general. It then explains shortcomings of other 
frameworks and the advantages of the analytical framework that was specifically created for this 
thesis. The chapter ends with a section on methods on data collection.  
3.1 Evaluation Background 
Evaluating policies is a way to help policymakers to make knowledgeable decisions in policy 
making (Vedung, 2000). There are different ways of evaluating policies. An evaluation can be 
carried out after the implementation of a policy (ex-post) or before the implementation of a 
policy (ex-ante). Following, the main aspects of both methods are explained.  
Ex-post evaluation 
In ex-post evaluations the effectiveness of already implemented policies in the aim of reaching 
their objectives can be assessed (Vedung, 2000; European Parliament & Council, 2002). For the 
assessment firstly available data and information has to be collected and in a further step 
assessed. Ex- post evaluations are a way to give feedback and information about the impact of 
a policy. It also shows if the expected objectives are reached. Policymakers can learn from 
previous mistakes and successes through the evaluation. If the result of an ex-post analysis is 
negative, an adjustment of the evaluated policy is recommended.  
Ex-ante evaluation 
Ex-ante evaluations on the other hand assess prospected effects of future policies. With the use 
of models and or scenarios different options can be assessed (Vaz & European Environment 
Agency, 2001). Article 10 of the 6th Environmental Action Program for the European Union 
(1600/2002/EC) says: ex ante evaluation is the “evaluation of the possible impacts (..) of new 
policies including the alternative of no action” (European Parliament and the Council, 2002, p. 
242/14). 
In the evaluation of policies experts recommend to described the following elements: actors, 
inputs, outputs and outcomes, impact and effectiveness (European Parliament and the Council, 
2002; Mickwitz, 2003).  
Actors are all bodies that are involved in the policymaking or are effected by the implemented 
policy (intended or unintended). These are for example authorities, NGOs, citizens, businesses.  
Inputs are all resources used in the making and implementation/ delivery of outputs. That 
includes finances, working hours, equipment etc. 
Outputs are the final product the target group faces, for example de-risking instruments like a 
streamlined permitting process.  
Outcomes are the reaction of the targeted group on the Outputs, for example the investment 
in renewable energy projects.  
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Impacts are the result of Outcomes such as higher renewable energy deployment. 
Effectiveness describes the capability of achieving a desired result. 
 
The analysis carried out in this thesis will not cover the elements actors and inputs due to a lack 
of information and difficulties obtaining them as an outsider.  
3.2 Analytical Framework  
After familiarising the reader with the background of evaluation, this section explains the 
analytical framework. In the de-risking literature there are predominately two analytical 
frameworks used that were developed by the UNDP and Deutsche Bank (UNDP et al., 2013; 
Deutsche Bank et al., 2011). 
Collecting and analysing de-risking literature in the literature review showed that current 
analytical frameworks have shortcomings. The UNDP framework as well as the framework by 
the Deutsche Bank have approaches that are not user-friendly. The approaches start with de-
risking areas (policy, financial and direct financial incentive) and then give options of de-risk 
instruments ( UNDP et al., 2013; Deutsche Bank et al., 2011). However, the section 2.1 on 
barriers and risks showed that RE investment barriers in emerging economies are diverse. 
Depending on different authors they are categorized in different categories (see chapter 2 
literature review) 
The framework used in this thesis uses the barrier categories developed in the literature review 
(see chapter 2) and lists all barriers and instruments found in literature. The newly established 
categories of the plentiful barriers are: technical barriers, political barriers, market barriers, 
informational barriers and administrational barriers.  
These categories form the foundation of the analytical framework. From there it is possible to 
find and assign a de-risk instrument that allows the removal of a barrier or risk. This approach 
is problem-based instead of de-risk areas/ instrument-based. It appears to be more practical 
since it focuses on barriers and instruments. The question which de-risk area the chosen 
instrument belongs to is of secular importance for the removal of a barrier and is therefore not 
in the front.  
Additional to de-risk instruments found, the instrument “restructure responsibilities” was 
added. Even though it is similar to the instrument “streamline permitting process”, it can further 
help to de-risk. The administrative barrier “Complex & time consuming permitting processed” 
as well as the market-related barrier “Controlled Market” are written in bold letter. That 
visualizes that they are main barriers with sub-barriers. Also the sub-barriers can be addressed with 
specific instruments. Table 4 shows the framework: Reading the table from the left starting from 
the barrier categories, to the right, finding a specific barrier, it is easy to select the right de-risk 
instrument.  
 
 
 
 
 
Windy Times in Emerging Economies 
27 
Table 3: Barrier Categories, Barriers and Corresponding De-Risk Instruments 
Barrier Category Barrier Instrument 
Political Insufficient cornerstone 
instruments 
Power Purchase Agreements (PPA) 
Feed-in Tariff (FiT) 
Price Premium 
Volatile policies Long-term (RE) Targets 
Insufficient R&D Increase R&D efforts 
Administrative Permitting process Streamline and simplify permitting process 
Restructure responsibilities and processes 
Trainings for staff 
Communicate responsibilities 
Diffusion of information  
Communication among 
actors 
Cooperation among actors 
Corruption 
Market Related Controlled Market Liberalize market 
Fossil fuel subsidies Remove fossil fuel subsidies 
Access to capital 
 
 
 
 
 
Gap funding 
Public equity co-investments 
Trainings  
Public loans/ soft loans 
Loan guarantees 
Carbon offset 
Tax credits 
Informational Availability of know-how Increase R&D 
Improve access to reliable information 
Communicate responsibilities 
Restructure responsibilities  
Improve RE social acceptance/ support 
Trainings for staff 
Improve O&M skills  
 
Access to reliable information 
Skilled labour 
Social acceptance 
Missing diffusion of information 
Technical No national wide standard Implement national wide standard 
Old infrastructure Improve infrastructure 
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The further analysis of this thesis is divided into four steps 1) identifying and describing the 
country context 2) analysing the effectiveness of current RE policies 3) developing policy 
scenarios with different policy de-risk instruments. Figure 6 visualises the approach used in this 
thesis.  
 
Figure 6: Analytical Steps 
Identify and describe country context  
The first step, to identify and describe the country context helps to get familiar with the country 
and builds the foundation for both analysis, the ex-post and the ex-ante, carried out in next 
steps. Chapter 4 “Country Context” is a systematic collection of RE related information in 
Vietnam. The data includes information on the energy sector, the RE environment and RE 
policies.  
Effectiveness analysis of current policies 
After the description of the context the effectiveness of the current policies were analysed.  
Identify barriers and risks for renewable energy investment 
In order to answer research question #1 “How conducive is Vietnam’s contextual setting to renewable 
energy investment?” the RE context in Vietnam was analysed. This is an ex-post analysis that was 
conducted by a review of policies & reports and other sources of information as well as by 
conducting interviews. Part of this analysis is the assessment of the currently used de-risk 
instruments. It shows which de-risk instruments are already used and how they influence 
barriers and risks. Furthermore, it assesses which barriers and risks are not sufficiently covered 
yet. A structured approach uses grades 1-3 to rate the successful application of de-risk 
instruments.  
Developing policy scenarios with different policy de-risk instruments  
In order to answer research question 2 “What are possible ways to de-risk renewable energy investments 
in Vietnam?” an ex-ante analysis was conducted. In the analysis five scenarios, that use different 
de-risk instruments, were created and advantages as well as disadvantages are described.  
3.3 Methods for Data Collection 
Different sources were used in order to obtain data for a thorough evaluation that made it 
possible to answer the research questions. The sources are: 
A. Journal articles and reports e.g. on de-risk, barriers, renewable energy, Vietnam, 
policies and policy evaluation 
B. Official governmental documents on (renewable) energy, support mechanisms and 
sustainable development  
1. Identify and 
describe country 
context 
2. Effectiveness 
analysis of current 
policies
3. Identify barriers 
and risks
4. Develop policy 
scenarios with 
different policy de-
risk instruments 
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C. Internet websites e. g. that cover news in Vietnam and energy developments  
D. Vietnamese newspapers (online and offline) 
Newspapers have a special function in Vietnam, since there is no free press in 
Vietnam. Newspapers are therefore are an organ for public announcements 
E. Semi-structured face-to-face interviews with 16 experts (see appendix) in Vietnam. The 
author could get in touch with experts through his previous work in Vietnam and with 
the help of his network. Furthermore, he attended the conference “The First 
International Workshop on Renewable Energy for the Mekong Delta” in the south of 
Vietnam, in the city Can Tho, where he interviewed several participants. The semi-
structured interviews allowed to get answers to the questions asked while the experts 
could also talk about their specific field of expertise and their experiences.   
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4 Vietnam Country Context 
This chapter is a systematic collection of renewable energy-related information in Vietnam and 
serves as a first step to get familiar with the country. The chapter gives an overview of Vietnam’s 
current state and presents the energy sector in detail with a focus on RE and aspects that are 
crucial for investors like the permitting process of RE projects. Furthermore, it describes 
energy-related policies. This chapter helps to answer research question #1 How conducive is 
Vietnam’s contextual setting to renewable energy investment. At the end of this chapter, based on the 
desk research, an ex-post analysis of the effectiveness of current policies is presented. It shows 
barriers and risks as well as opportunities for RE developers. 
4.1 General Information 
Vietnam is a country located in South 
East Asia with a territory of more than 
330.000 square meters and a population 
of about 90 million. Figure 7 is a map of 
Vietnam showing the location and the 
bordering countries. The population in 
Vietnam is rather young with an average 
age of 29.6 years (C.I.A., 2016). About 
65% of the total population lives in rural 
areas, with a trend towards more people 
living in cities. Since the opening of the 
country’s economy with the introduction 
of a market-based economy (Doi Moi) in 
1986, the country had remarkable 
economic growth rates. In 1988 the 
agricultural sector accounted for 46.3% 
of the GDP. Since then other sectors 
gained importance. Today, the most 
important sectors are the industrial and 
service sector. In 2014 the agricultural 
sector accounted for only 17% of the 
GDP, while the service sector accounted 
for 44% and the industrial sector for 
39%. Due to the constant economic 
growth of about 6.2% per annum since 
Doi Moi, the GDP per capita increased 
from US$699 to US$2052 in nominal 
terms in the period from 2005-2014 
(C.I.A., 2016). Consequently, Vietnam 
officially made the step from a low-
income country to a lower middle-
income country in 2009.  
The strong economic growth of the country allowed Vietnam to take the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) seriously and to strive to solve some of the most pressing issues 
in the country. Internationally Vietnam is considered as one of the top countries in the 
achievement of the MDGs, which were planned to be achieved by 2015. It managed to make 
substantial improvements in most of the goals and fully achieved the goals (World Bank, 2016):  
 
Figure 7: Map of Vietnam 
Source: (Vietnam.nz, 2016) 
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 #1 Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger 
 #2 Achieve Universal Primary Education 
 #3 Promote Gender Equality 
Especially in the achievement of goal #1 “Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger” big 
advances were made. The poverty rate dropped from 15.5% in 2005 to 8.4% in 2014. 
Furthermore, Vietnam made advances in health-related goals. However, goal # 7 “Ensure 
Environmental Sustainability” was not achieved even though international reports rank Vietnam 
among the 10 countries most affected by climate change. In the last 50 years the temperature 
increased by 0.5°C to 0.7°C, which led to a sea level rise by about 20 cm (Socialist Republic of 
Viet Nam, 2015). Along the enormous coastline the effects can already be seen. Beaches are 
diminishing and in some regions (for example in the Mekong Delta) the groundwater is getting 
saline.  
Even though MDG goal #7 was not achieved yet, there are new strategies and regulations to 
decrease Vietnam’s environmental impact. In 2012, the government introduced a green growth 
strategy (VGGS) that supports sustainable development (ISPONRE, 2009). The objective of 
the National Green Growth Strategy is: “to achieve the low carbon economy and to enrich 
natural capital, (…) which requires that mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions (…)” (Viet Nam 
News, 2015c). The strategy aims to reduce GHGs in the energy sector by 10-20% in the period 
2011-2020 in a business as usual (BAU) scenario (baseline 2010). 10% of the reduction goal is 
voluntary reduction and 10% will depend on the financial help of international donors.  
Additionally, Vietnam submitted, prior to the Climate Conference in Paris in December 2015, 
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) stating the country will decrease it’s 
GHG by 8% by 2030, respectively by up to 25% by 2030 (baseline 2010) if international actors 
support the development (Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2012).  
However, Vietnam faces a big obstacle: corruption. In a 2015 survey about corruption by 
Transparency International Vietnam ranked 112 out of 167 countries on (Transparency 
International, 2015). In a state visit in May 2016 the president of the United States of America, 
Barack Obama pointed out, that development agencies as well as private companies frequently 
have to bribe. They have to pay officials to be able to carry out and finish projects. The amount 
of the bribes are usually between 20% and 50% of the project costs (Harris, 2016). 
4.2 Energy Sector 
This section gives an overview about the energy sector in Vietnam, which is fast changing. 
Following are up-to-date information on Vietnam’s primary energy resources, electrification, 
electricity demand and supply, energy security, energy infrastructure and electricity tariffs.  
Primary Energy Resources & Power Challenges 
This section provides information about Vietnam’s domestic primary energy resources, on wind 
and solar potential and current and future power challenges.  
Primary Energy Resources 
In Vietnam several primary energy resources can be found. These are coal, oil, natural gas, 
uranium and water for hydropower. Furthermore, there is a high potential for other renewable 
energies such as biomass, geothermal, wind and sun (Massmann, 2011).  
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Wind 
In terms of wind power potential Vietnam profits from two aspects. Firstly, it has a costal line 
of more than 3000 km. Secondly, the country is located in a monsoon area. For the two reasons 
Vietnam has good climate conditions for wind energy. In the last couple of years several 
organizations undertook studies and wind speed measurements. A study conducted by MOIT 
measured that there are good to excellent wind speeds on 8.6% of the Vietnamese territory 
(MOIT & AWS Truepower, 2011). Some sources say the total technical3 potential for wind 
power projects in Vietnam is around 27 GW with an average wind speed starting from 6 m/s 
(MOIT & AWS Truepower, 2011). However, others claim that there are not reliable studies 
about the wind power potential in Vietnam yet. The data available on total wind power technical 
potential contains figures from under 2000 MW to up to 100,000 MW (MOIT & AWS 
Truepower, 2011).  
Solar 
Since the country is located in a subtropical area, close to the equator, the conditions for solar 
energy are generally good. A report by a Spanish consortium came to the result that the 
theoretical potential for concentrated solar power (CSP)4 systems lies between 60-100 Gigawatt-
hours (GWh) per year, while the theoretical potential for PV systems is between 0.8-1.2 GWh/ 
year (Massmann, 2015). The intensity of solar radiation is similar to Spain’s and Italy’s (Nguyen 
Ninh Hai et al., 2015). The potential is similar to locations in Thailand and the Philippines (Asia 
Biomass, 2015). 
Power Challenges 
Despite the rich primary energy source the country is standing at a crossroad. The country’s 
electricity demand is increasing fast and the primary energy sources, coal, oil and natural gas are 
almost exhausted. Since energy-intensive industry is the core of the economic growth, the 
government is highly concerned about energy security. A statement by the prime minister 
Nguyen Tan Dung from the begining of 2016 shows the importance of the energy development: 
”Energy is of paramount importance to Vietnam’s growth and it is a decisive factor for the 
country’s high and sustainable growth. It is difficult for Vietnam to realize growth targets if 
energy runs short” (Viet Nam Energy, 2016).  
Currently Vietnam plans to cope with the increasing electricity demand mainly by building new 
coal power plants. This brings the country into a new dependency of coal exporting countries 
and has a negative impact on the national trade balance sheet (Viet Nam Energy, 2016). Until 
the 1990s most of the fossil fuels extracted within Vietnam were exported. This has changed 
drastically in the last two decades. With increasing energy demand, the domestically available 
resources were used within the country. That led to a decreasing export of natural resources to 
neighbouring countries. Today the coal extracted in Vietnam does not meet the national demand 
anymore. In order to meet the increasing demand of coal, the fossil fuel has to be imported. In 
2016 the country imports several millions of tons already, by 2020 it will be about 20-30 million 
tons of coal per annum (Viet Nam Energy, 2016).  
Additional to the shrinking coal reserves, the gas and oil reserves are declining too. Experts say, 
that they will be exhausted within 20-30 years (Viet Nam Energy, 2016). Much of the reserves 
                                                 
3 Technical potential does not take into account any economic or market concerns but only system/topographic constrains, 
land-use constraints and system performance (Delegation of German Industry and Commerce in Vietnam, 2015). 
4 By using mirrors or lenses, large areas of sunlight are concentrated onto a small area that results in high temperatures which 
are used for running a generator 
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will not be exported but used domestically. The government published a strategy to “actively 
seek for the replacement of gas sources which shall be declined and depleted in the near future” 
(Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2016). Additionally, the government is looking for countries to 
have long-term coal import contracts with (Massmann, 2015). 
Especially during hot summer month there are frequent power shortages in Vietnam. There are 
two reasons for it (Viet Nam News, 2016a; Viet Nam News, 2016): firstly, hot weather leads to 
an intensified use of cooling technology such as air conditioning systems that lead to an 
increased electricity demand. Secondly, rivers contain less water in hot summer months. This 
phenomenon is getting even stronger with climate change. As a consequence, the pattern of 
precipitation is changing and temperatures are increasing. Since a high share of more than 37% 
of electricity is generated by hydropower plants, the changes in the water flow are noticeable 
(Viet Nam News, 2010). 
Electrification & Energy Infrastructure 
This section provides information on the state of electrification and on the energy infrastructure 
in Vietnam. 
Electrification 
In terms of electrification Vietnam has made strong and fast progress (IEA, 2016b). In 1998 
only 77% of all households were connected to the power grid, compared to 96% in the year 
2010 (Khanh Toan et al., 2011). An improvement of the rural electrification could be achieved 
too. While in 1976, one year after the reunification of North- and South Vietnam, only 2.5% of 
the rural population had access to electricity, is was 98% of them in 2013 (WB 2015b).  
Most of the 9,120 communes in Vietnam are already connected to the power grid (World Bank, 
2012). However, 41 of them (0.5%) get electricity from local power production. In another 41 
communities, mainly in mountainous regions and on islands there are off-grid solutions, instead 
of a costlier connection to the national grid. About 1 million Vietnamese in 189 communities 
remain without access to electricity until today.  
However, in Vietnam there are constant power cuts, especially in rural areas but also in urban 
areas (USAID, 2014). Consequently, being connected to the power grid does not mean to have 
a constant access to electricity (World Bank, 2013). Thus, a large number of factories, offices, 
hotels and high-class homes prepared for these circumstances by installing diesel power 
generators.  
Energy Infrastructure 
The constant power cuts show that the electricity infrastructure is in poor conditions with high 
electricity losses in transmission and distribution (IEA, 2016a). However, the losses were already 
considerably lowered in the last decade. In 1990, losses were still 25.4% while in 2012 they were 
drastically reduced to about 8.9% (Asian Development Bank, 2015a).  
Improving the infrastructure is expensive: huge investments have to be carried out. Alone in 
the last five years, the State Owned Enterprise (SOE) Electricity of Vietnam (EVN, which is 
the owner of the electricity grid, spent 480,000bn (US$22.3bn) on power plants and the 
electricity grid (Asian Development Bank, 2015a). A big and important project was a new 
transmission line that improves the north-south electricity exchange. For the period 2016-2020 
another investment package of Vietnamese Dong (VND) 600.000bn (US$27.9bn) is planned to 
be spent in the electricity sector with the help of international partners and development 
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assistance loans (Enerdata, 2015). The revised PDP VII states that total needed investment in 
the electricity sector for the period 2014-2030 is US$130.64 billion (US$55.46 billion for 2014–
2020, US$35.86 billion for 2021–2025, and US$39.32 billion for 2026–2030) (Socialist Republic 
of Vietnam, 2016). The power sector will need investments between US$94.12 billion for 
generation expansion (including private investments) and US$36.52 billion investments for 
improving the transmission and distribution network (Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2016). 
Investment costs are often amplified by the lack of basic infrastructure. Bridges and streets that 
can stand heavy vehicles and machinery are often missing and have to be built before any 
energy-related projects can be carried out.  
One obstacle in the endeavour to update the infrastructure is EVN’s shortage of money. In the 
last couple of years, the SOE made major losses. Alone in the year 2014 the company reported 
a loss of VND16.8 trillion (US$789.6 million), even though it had increased the electricity prices 
steadily (Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2016). EVN will not be able to get enough funding for 
improving the whole infrastructure on its own but needs the help of international partners and 
private investors.  
Electricity Demand & Supply  
This section provides information on the electricity demand and supply. 
Electricity Demand 
In Vietnam the energy demand increases steadily. However, compared to other countries, 
Vietnam’s per capita energy consumption is still low: in 2013 Vietnam consumed 0.67 tons of 
oil equivalents5 (toe) per capita (Pham Khanh et al., 2012). The international average is 1.9 
toe/cap. Yet, when it comes to CO2 emissions per GDP (energy intensity) Vietnam ranks 19 (1 
is worst) in a global comparison with more than 140 countries (data from 2013) (IEA, 2016b). 
It emits 1.41 kg CO2-equivalents per US dollar of GDP. For comparison: in Germany the ration 
is 0.24 kg/US dollar of GDP. 
The national electricity demand is projected to drastically increasing too (see figure 8). The 
official governmental Power Development Plan (PDP) VII by the Vietnamese government 
projects an annual demand increase of 9.9% for the period 2016-2020, of 8.1% in the period 
2021-2025 and 7.2% between 2026-2030 (IEA, 2015). The increase goes back to several changes 
(Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2011c). First of all, the population is still growing, which results 
in more electricity users (Asian Development Bank, 2015a). Secondly, fast urbanization is 
happening with more people living in cities, using more electricity. However, the most important 
change is the economy. The fast-growing economy and a consequently wealth-gaining 
population consumes more electricity. However, also within Vietnam and its society there are 
big disparities. While big parts of the population in cities start using devices that consume high 
amounts of electricity, such as air conditioning systems, freezers, fridges and washing machines, 
the rural population remains poor on average and consumes a lot less electricity (C.I.A., 2016); 
(Anandarajah & Tomei, 2015). In the period between 1990 and 2014, electricity demand 
increased by 12-15% annually (Asian Development Bank, 2015a). In 2014, the main electricity 
consumer was the industry with a share of 53.9%, private households consumed the second 
most electricity with a share of 35.6% followed by the commercial sector with a share of 4.8% 
(Viet Nam Energy, 2016). The agricultural and forest sector together had a share of 1.5% and 
other sectors consumed 4.5% of total electricity in Vietnam.  
                                                 
5 Tonne of oil equivalent (toe) is a unit of energy defined as the amount of energy released by burning one tonne of crude oil. 
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Figure 8: Total Projected Demand in billion kWh 2015-2030 
Source: (Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2011c) 
Electricity Supply 
In order to meet the demand increase, the supply increased too. Since 1990, electricity 
generation increased from 8.6 Terawatt-hours (TWh) to 145.5 TWh in 2014. In 2014, the total 
installed capacity was 34 GW (Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2011c). 37.62% of electricity was 
generated by hydropower plants. Second most electricity was generated by gas power plants 
with a share of 30.89%, followed by coal (25.86%) (Viet Nam Energy, 2016). In figure 9 the 
electricity generation capacity can be seen from the period 1971-2013. The governmental 
response to the increasing energy demand is to quadruple the installed power generation 
capacity from 19,735 MW (2010) to around 75,000 MW in 2020 (ADB, 2015).  
The current plan foresees to mainly install new coal power plants. EVN, the state-owed 
electricity utility, expands fast: 10 new coal power plans are currently under construction with a 
capacity of more than 5.000 MW (KfW Development Bank, 2015; Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam, 2015b). Additionally, it plans on developing another 34 coal power plants with a total 
capacity of 9,853 MW.  
Furthermore, there are plans to build nuclear power plants (Enerdata, 2015). However, the 
construction of them were already delayed several times (Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2011c). 
Today, sources say the construction would start in 2019 or 2020 (Thanh Nien Daily, 2015); 
(Thanh Nien Daily, 2015). An agreement to cooperate in the development and construction of 
a nuclear power plant (NPP) was already signed with Russia (World Nuclear Associatoin, 2016). 
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Figure 9: Electricity Generation by Fuel in Vietnam 
Source: (IEA, 2016a) 
Electricity Tariffs 
The electricity market in Vietnam is not a free, liberalized market but highly regulated by the 
state. Hence electricity prices are set by the government and do not reflect the actual costs for 
generation and distribution. At present, the average electricity price is VND1,622/kWh (incl. 
tax) (abt. 7.2 US$ cents) on-grid and up to VND3,772/ kWh on islands and in mountainous 
rural areas (MOIT, 2015).  
The SOE, Electricity of Vietnam (EVN), is not allowed to set the electricity prices 
independently. Instead, the price-setting process depends on three organizations: the General 
Directorate Energy (GDE), which is the energy department of the Ministry of Industry and 
Trade (MOIT), the Electricity Regulatory Authority of Vietnam (ERAV) and Electricity of 
Vietnam (EVN) (MOIT, 2015).6 For tariff-increases between 2-5% EVN has to get an approval 
by MOIT/ the GDE. If an increase exceeds 5% the MOIT reviews the proposition and 
forwards it to the prime minister who has to approve the decision. For the national grid, the 
Ministry of Industry and Trade (MOIT) sets different electricity prices for different consumer 
groups and consumption times. Prices in off-peak hours are distinctly lower than in peak hours 
to relieve pressure on the network. For example, the retail price of electricity to the productive 
sectors (voltage level from 110 kV and above) is 869 VND/kWh in off-peak hours (“low 
hours”) and VND2,459/kWh in peak hours.  
The decision No. 2256/QD-BCT on electricity prices, dated 12 March 2015, contains eight 
different price categories with various sub categories, such as amount of consumption (level 1: 
0- 50 kWh up to level 6: 401- kWh), region (urban, rural), time (normal, low, peak) and voltage 
levels (MOIT, 2015). The eight categories are:  
1. Retail price of electricity to productive sectors  
                                                 
6 The responsabilities of the actors are further explained in the section “actors”. 
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2. Retail price of electricity to administrative units 
3. Retail price of electricity to businesses  
4. Retail price of electricity to domestic activities 
5. Wholesale price of electricity in rural areas 
6. Wholesale price of electricity to collective quarters, residential agglomeration  
7. Wholesale price of electricity to commercial – service – domestic complexes 
8. Wholesale price of electricity to industrial zones  
 
There are lower prices for consumers with lower consumption rates lower income households 
usually use less electricity. Consequently, consumers with higher consumption rates cross 
subsidize the tariffs of poorer consumers. Table 16 in the appendix is an example of different 
prices for different consumer groups.  
Furthermore, there are indirect subsidies on electricity in Vietnam. The government subsidizes 
domestic coal and has set the price below world market prices (MOIT, 2015). The main reason 
is to lower electricity prices for the production of goods and therewith to attract investors. From 
2007 to 2012, the indirect subsidies on electricity have costed tax payers annually between 
US$1.2 billion and US$4.49 billion (UNDP, 2012b).  
International as well as national experts have repeatedly expressed their concerns about the low 
electricity prices. Experts say, the prices are 20-30 % too low (UNDP, 2012a). The World Bank 
even recommended an increase of the electricity price by 40% in the next three years. The 
director of the Institute of Energy in Vietnam, Mr. Hoang Tien Dung, made a statement, saying 
the electricity price should be increased by 50 - 60% to assure “reasonable profit” and increase 
investors’ interest (Delegation of German Industry and Commerce in Vietnam, 2015). 
However, in the last decade electricity prices were already increased several times (UNDP, 
2012a). The last time the prices were increased the deputy minister of MOIT, Do Thang Hai, 
said that EVN had to raise electricity prices, in order to protect the SOE from bankruptcy (The 
Economist, 2013). Between 2004 and 2009 the price increase was about 3.8% yearly 
(Vietnamnet, 2015). From 2010 onwards, prices increased by about 9.5% year after year, which 
resulted in an increase of more than 50% in the last ten years.  
4.3 Renewable Energy Environment 
This section has a focus on RE in Vietnam. Crucial actors in regulation and generation are 
described as well as the permitting process for wind energy projects, wind and solar potential in 
Vietnam, the current deployment and RE related policies.  
Actors 
In the (renewable) energy sector in Vietnam, multiple actors are involved. There are several 
actors on the regulatory/ governmental side and only few on the generating side. Power 
generation is dominated by state-owned enterprises. This chapter gives an overview about the 
actors involved and their responsibilities (UNDP, 2012a); (Pham Khanh et al., 2012); (UNDP, 
2012a). 
Regulation 
At the national level, several ministries are involved. The ministries most involved are the 
Ministry of Industry and Trade (MOIT), the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the Ministry of 
Planning & Investment (MPI). The MOIT is the overlooking ministry that takes the lead with 
only the prime minister above it.  
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Ministry of Industry and Trade (MOIT) 
The Ministry of Industry and Trade (MOIT) is the ministry responsible for energy related topics. 
They include a) developing energy strategies such as the ‘Power Development Plan’, b) the 
formulation of energy policies, RE as well as fossil fuel energy plans and pricing. 
General Directorate of Energy (GDE) 
The GDE is the energy department of the MOIT. It supports the MOIT in any energy-related 
topics, in particular when it comes to bureaucratic tasks and regulations in oil and gas 
exploitation, electricity generation, nuclear and RE. The GDE is also responsible for the 
elaboration of details in the Power Development Plans, especially for provinces and cities. 
However, the MOIT always has to sign and approve their plans. Furthermore, the GDE is 
responsible for the planning of new power plants and for the development of investment 
incentives for RE plants.  
Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
The annual investment plans are created under the collaboration of the Ministry of Industry and 
Trade (MOIT) and the Ministry of Finance (MOF). The MOF is in charge of the overall state 
budget allocation as well as the budget allocation for RE projects and financial risk management.  
The Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) 
The Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) is responsible for the financial aspects of RE 
strategies and planning. That includes ways to attract foreign investment, both official 
development assistance (ODA) and private money.  
The Electricity Regulatory Authority of Vietnam (ERAV) 
The Electricity Regulatory Authority of Vietnam (ERAV) is responsible for regulating the 
electricity market under the supervision of the MOIT. Its main duties are a) the permitting of 
electricity operation licenses b) the management of the electricity wholesale price, the 
transmission and distribution costs c) review of end consumer’s electricity prices and d) 
developing the liberalization-strategy of the energy sector.  
Departments of Industry and Trade (DOIT) 
At the provincial level there are Departments of Industry and Trade (DOIT) that help the 
Provincial People’s Committees (PPCs) managing topics related to energy. It is also involved in 
the development of the Power Development Master Plan. However, the MOIT gives technical 
advice to the DOITs. 
People’s Committee (PC) 
On the provincial level there are committees, carrying out the central government’s functions. 
It is therefore the local executive organization of the government. In total there are 58 provinces 
and five additional municipalities with one PC each. The PCs are also responsible for wind 
energy project permits.  
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New and Renewable Energy Department 
The New and Renewable Energy Department is the actor specialized in the development of 
RE projects.  
Vietnam Institute of Energy 
The Vietnam Institute of Energy is a public consultancy that does its own research on energy-
related questions. It also helps the MOIT and EVN in crucial decisions and the development 
of the national energy strategy. That includes to estimate future energy demand and to 
evaluate the feasibility of projects.  
Energy Generation 
On the side of energy generation, the main actors are three state-owned enterprises: EVN 
(Electricity of Vietnam), Vietnam Oil and Gas Group (Petro Vietnam) and the Vietnam 
National Coal and Mineral Industries Group (Vinacomin).  
Petro Vietnam 
Petro Vietnam is specialized in petroleum and hydrocarbon exportation and production.  
Vinacomin 
Vinacomin is specialized in coal and mineral exploration, processing. The company constructs 
and operates coal power plants. 
Electricity of Vietnam (EVN) 
The main actor in energy generation is Electricity of Vietnam (EVN) with a market share of 
53.5% in 2015 (see figure 10). It is a state-owned enterprise (SOE) that is active in power 
generation, transmission, distribution and sales. It is the owner of the national transmission 
system and therefore the only buyer of generated electricity. Additionally, it has a monopoly on 
customer services. Even though it is the biggest actor in the market, it is struggling financially. 
In 2014, it reported a financial loss of 789.6 million US$ (Anandarajah & Tomei, 2015).  
Figure 10 shows the share of generated electricity of the state-owned and other actors such as 
local developers, Joint Stock Companies (JSC) and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).  
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Figure 10: Ownership of Generated Electricity in Vietnam 
Source: (Delegation of German Industry and Commerce in Vietnam, 2015) 
Permitting Process 
This section has a closer look at the permitting process. For large-scale RE developers it is 
crucial to have transparent and easy permitting processes in place to avoid any delays of the 
planning and construction of a project. The permitting process for wind energy projects in 
Vietnam consists of up to ten single steps. There is no national-wide regulation of the permitting 
process, instead it is in the hands of the administrative provinces (in total there are 58) to 
regulate. Every one of them is entitled to regulate RE permitting procedures. Following, the 
steps are explained: 
A. Pre-feasibility study, permission for wind measurements  
For project developers the first step of a project is to carry out a pre-feasibility study that 
contains, among other things, the distance to the grid, available basic infrastructure and 
topography. Furthermore, the developer asks for permission to carry out wind measurements. 
Involved actors are the Provincial Department of Industry and Trade (DOIT), People’s 
Committee (PC), the Department of Planning and Investment (DPI). The DOIT/ DPI is also 
responsible to authorize the wind measurement  
B. Site Approval, land use rights (optional)  
Not every site that is attractive for wind power projects is part of the official power 
development plan of the province yet. If a site it not part of it yet, it has to be approved.  
 
C. Site registration, wind measurement 
Once the investor has fulfilled the previous steps, they can register the site at the People’s 
Committee (PC). After the registration wind measurements can commence which usually takes 
12 months.  
D. Feasibility study, Investment license 
If the wind speed is favorable, the project developer carries out a feasibility study and applies 
for an investment license. Involved in this process are DOIT, DPI, MOIT, prime minister, 
energy utility company and PC. The People’s Committee receives the investment license 
application and sends it to the MOIT. Among other things, it contains information on the total 
investment sum, environmental impact assessment, results of wind measurements, and a PPA 
agreement with EVN. 
E. Land clearance, site preparation 
The investor asks the PC to clear the land.  
F. Investment Report 
The investor has to submit a detailed investment report with project description and technical 
specifications. 
G. Power Purchase Agreement  
A PPA is signed.  
H. Contract on grid connection 
The project has to get connected to the grid. The developer has to bear the costs.  
I. Construction license, ownership certificate 
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Several documents and information that were obtained before have to handed to the PC to get 
a construction license such as investment license, technical design of project and financial 
aspects. The Department of Construction (DOC) reviews it to avoid mismatches with military 
activities and aviation.  
J. Electricity operation license 
If all involved parties agree, the project developer receives an operation license that is valid for 
20 years.  
4.4 Renewable Energy Policies 
For renewable energy investors it is important to know that a government is committed to RE 
deployment. By approving supporting laws and regulations, RE investors have a higher 
investment security. This section presents and explains the most important recent regulatory 
changes in the power sector. 
In the last couple of years, the Vietnamese government approved several policies and strategies. 
The official goals and strategies aim to increase the share of RE. The focus is on the deployment 
of wind energy, biomass and biogas. Solar energy is not a part of the strategies yet. The 
documents are presented in this section are the a) the National Master Plan for Power 
Development/ the Revised National Power Development Master Plan b) the Decision on 
Mechanisms for Support and Development of Wind Power Projects c) the Renewable 
Development Strategy c) the Power Sector Restructuring Strategy. 
National Master Plan for Power Development  
The “National Master Plan for Power Development for the 2011- 2020 Period with the Vision 
to 2030”, also called “Power Development Plan” (PDP) was approved by the Vietnamese 
government on June 21, 2011. This governmental document is the key document for the energy 
sector. It analyses future electricity demand and supply and contains a deployment strategy. It 
sets targets and encloses plans on how to meet the demand and is re-adjusted every five years. 
The latest, seventh version, the PDP VII has the official decision number 1208/QD-TTg 
(Delegation of German Industry and Commerce in Vietnam, 2015).  
In 2016 the PDP VII was revised (Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2011c). A few changes - mainly 
in the power deployment plan - were incorporated. The revised PDP has the decision number 
428/QD-TTg dated March 18, 2016 and the name “Approval of the Revised National Power 
Development Master Plan for the 2011-2020 Period with the Vision to 2030”. 
The Power Development Plan’s objectives are to a) increase the electricity generation to meet 
the demand b) increase the share of renewable energy c) reduce electricity elasticity coefficient 
d) electrify mountainous and rural areas. The objective with the highest prominence is the 
development of an energy sector that meets the demand of the county “in conjunction with the 
national socio-economic development strategies” (Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2016). The 
goal is to provide electricity to all Vietnamese households, either on-grid or off-grid by 2020. 
The Power Development Plans projects the average annual electricity demand growth rate for 
the period 2011- 2030 between 7.2% and 14.1%. That means the electricity demand in 2030 will 
be about seven times higher compared to 2010.  
Power Deployment 
In order to meet the increasing electricity demand the government plans to increase the national 
electricity generation capacity. The national electricity mix will change until the year 2030 (see 
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figure 11). A big share of the demand is planned to be covered by coal power plants. Their 
capacity is planned to increase from 35GW in 2020 to 75GW in 2030. The share of natural gas 
decreases from 24% in 2020 to 15% in 2030. The share of hydropower in the energy mix 
decreases as well, mainly because suitable locations for new hydropower plants are rare. The 
share of imported electricity from the neighbouring countries Laos, Cambodia and China is 
planned to increase to 4% in 2030. Additionally, there are plans to build nuclear power plants 
(Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2011c). 
The PDP VII sets the target to increase the RE share. In 2010, the share of RE in the total 
electricity capacity was 3.5%. The target for 2020 is a share of 4.5%, respectively 6% in 2030. 
The capacity of wind power plants is planned to reach 1000MW in 2020 (0.7% of total electricity 
capacity) and 6200 MW in 2030 (2.4% of total electricity capacity).  
The Revised National Power Development Master Plan has lower wind power capacity targets 
(Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2011c). The capacity of wind power plants is planned to reach 
800 MW in 2020 (0.8% of total electricity capacity) and 2000 MW in 2025 (1% of total electricity 
capacity) and 6000 MW in 2030 (2.1% of total electricity capacity). In the revised document 
there are also goals for solar power deployment for the first time. The target for solar power 
capacity for 2020 is 850 MW (0.5% of total capacity), 4,000 MW (1.6% of total capacity) in 2025 
and 12,000 MW (3.3% of total capacity) in 2030.  
 
Figure 11: Targeted Power Capacity for 2020 and 2030 
Source: (Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2011c) 
Financial Aspects 
The plan includes a passage on private investment in the energy sector. It states that private 
investments and increased competition is needed. However, since the electricity price is 
currently rather low (see chapter “electricity tariff rates”) it will be increased from the current 
average price of US$7.2 cents /kWh to US$8-9 cents/ kWh by 2020. The higher price will make 
it easier for investors to develop financially feasible projects. Furthermore, it will help to increase 
efforts to conserve electricity by using it more efficiently.  
Mechanisms for Support and Development of Wind Power Projects  
On June 29th, 2011 the “Decision on Mechanisms for Support and Development of Wind Power 
Projects in Vietnam” with the decision number 37/2011/QD-TTg was approved by the prime 
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minister (Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2011c). The decision regulates and approves support 
mechanisms for wind power projects.  
Financial Aspects 
For the first time in Vietnam a decision regulates a premium for electricity generated in RE 
projects. Wind power project developers can expect concluding a Power Purchase Agreement 
(PPA) over 20 years with the state- owned electricity buyer, the Vietnamese power utility EVN. 
The agreement is coupled with a FiT over VND1,614 (about US$6,8 cents) /kWh. In addition 
to to the US$6,8 cents, RE power generators receive US$1 cent/kWh from the Vietnam 
Environment Protection Fund, established by the government. Therefore, wind energy 
developers receive US$7,8 cents/kWh in total.  
Beside the FiT the government agreed on more benefits for developers, such as i) tax 
exemptions on import duties for technologies related to wind power projects that cannot be 
purchased locally, and ii) free land or a reduced land lease fee. During the operational phase, 
special benefits for project operators are available too. There are tax exemptions on corporate 
income tax for the first 1- 4 years, and a 50% tax reduction for the next 5-13 years. Furthermore, 
there is an option for wind power project developers to sell Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) certificates, which can further increase the revenue of project developers.  
Renewable Energy Strategy 
The decision “Vietnam’s Renewable Energy Development Strategy up to 2030 with an outlook 
to 2050” (No.: 2068/QĐ-TTg) was approved by the prime minister on November 25 2015. It 
is a comprehensive strategy on how to improve the RE investment environment in Vietnam. 
Its main objectives are to a) increase the share of renewable energy b) improve the energy 
security and c) electrify “most” household by 2020 
 
Energy Deployment 
The RE strategy includes deployment numbers for hydropower, biomass, onshore wind and 
solar. In figure 12 the projected share of solar and wind power can be seen. Wind energy’s share 
of generated electricity is expected to increase to 1% by 2020, 2.7% by 2030 and 5% by 2050, 
respectively 2.5 billion kWh in 2020, 16 billion kWh in 2030 and 53 billion kWh in 2050. For 
the first time, there are targets for solar power too. The targets are to be achieved are 0.5% (1.4 
billion kWh) by 2020, 6% (35.4 billion kWh) by 2030 and 20% (210 billion kWh) by 2050. 
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Figure 12: Projected Share of RE in Total Electricity Supply 
Source: (Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2011c) 
RE Support Strategies 
The RE strategy states that Vietnam aims to build up its own RE equipment industry in order 
to import less RE technology. The industry is planned to grow quickly with the help of state 
support. In addition to the benefits of a new industry, the state also hopes to increase energy 
security with the deployment of more RE and to improve energy supply for rural areas. The 
government tries to improve the investment climate by protecting “the legitimate rights and 
interests of those organizations/individuals that develop and utilize RE sources.”(Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam, 2011c)  
The strategy also shows that the government is aware of barriers that RE investors face. For 
that reason, several improvements are planned. The strategy states to improve the 
governmental management “in terms of the management of development activities and RE 
utilization the renewable energy sector” (Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2015b, p. 6). It declares 
that the MOIT will be the responsible actor national wide, together with ministries that cover 
specific topics (see chapter 4.2 “actors”). Furthermore, RE agencies are planned at the provincial 
level. Their duties are planned to include RE management, development and utilization. Data 
on RE potential is planned to be improved by measurement efforts throughout the country. 
Based on the data obtained, a nation-wide RE development plan is planned. The MOIT also 
plans to develop nation-wide technical standards and norms. Also, an improvement of the 
RE development and utilization is planned by “encouraging organizations/individuals” 
(Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2015b, p. 2). For example, in rural areas the PPC is supposed to 
promote the use of RE. Financial support mechanisms for RE deployment are mentioned 
in the RE strategy too. The strategy aims to put an environmental fee on the use of fossil fuels. 
Part of that income is earmarked for a Sustainable Energy Promotion Found that supports, e.g., 
the deployment and use of and research and development of RE technology. On the agenda of 
the Renewable Energy Strategy is also the improvement of human capital “at all levels” 
(Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2015b, p. 9). This also includes the support of universities. The 
promotion of RE and rising the awareness on RE technology by improved communication 
and information is part of the strategy too. An improved cooperation between Vietnam and 
international partners in the area of RE is a goal too. The main expectation is to benefit from 
technology transfer. 
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Financial Aspects 
Financial support instruments to attract private investors are the same as in the “Decision on 
Mechanisms for Support and Development of Wind Power Projects in Vietnam” from June 
29th, 2011. This includes tax exemptions on import duties, corporate income tax (CIT) reduction 
and land-use tax/ charges and environmental protection fees exemptions.  
Power Sector Restructuring Strategy 
The decision “Approving of the Scheme of Vietnam's Power Sector Restructuring for the cause 
of industrialization and modernization and sustainable development until 2020, vision to 2030" 
with the decree number No: 14318 / QD-BCT was approved on December 25 2015. It builds 
upon the “Approval of the conceptual design of the Wholesale Electricity Market of Vietnam” 
with the decree number Số : 6463/2014/QĐ-BCT which was approved by the prime minister 
on July 22, 2014 (Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2015b, p. 10). The main goal of the Power 
Sector Restructuring Strategy is to liberalize the energy sector. With the liberalization it aims to 
meet the energy demand in a sustainable manner at a reasonable price (Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam, 2014). 
The single buyer market that is currently in place is expected to be changed with the 
implementation of the decision. The strategy aims to break the market dominance of EVN and 
to attract independent power distribution companies and retail companies that buy electricity at 
a wholesale spot market. However, a certain share (up to 30%) of any company in the sector 
will remain to be owned by EVN. 
The strategy asks for more international investment, cooperation and foreign aid. It is 
emphasized that the remuneration for RE will be high enough to attract RE investors (Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam, 2015a). Furthermore, the strategy states that pricing will become more 
transparent. The power sector-restructuring plan is divided into 4 stages: 
In stage 1 (2015-2017) the introduction of a market-based electricity market starts. Before the 
reform power corporations bought 5% of the total electricity at market price. The rest was 
bought for a bulk price between EVN and power corporations.  
In stage 2 (2017-2019) a fee for the utilization of the power grid and other services will be 
introduced. The share of electricity power corporations purchase for a market price will be 
increased. 
In stage 3 (2019 – 2021) the wholesale electricity market is planned to be fully liberalized. All 
electricity will be sold at market price. 
In stage 4 (beginning in 2022) the implementation of a competitive retail market is planned 
to begin.  
4.5 Summary of Country Context 
In this chapter, the results of a systematic desk research were presented to provide a general 
understanding about Vietnam and its energy sector. In the next chapter, the results of the desk 
research will be complimented with the results from the expert interviews. That allows a validity 
check and the inclusion of information provided by experts/ practitioners. The different sources 
combined will allow answering research question 1: How conducive is Vietnam’s contextual setting to 
renewable energy investment?   
Identification of barriers and risks for renewable energy investment 
The description of the energy context of Vietnam shows that there are barriers and risks as well 
as opportunities. The main opportunities are a steadily increasing electricity demand that 
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already leads to frequent power cuts. Investments into new power capacity are necessary 
but the main actor in the energy sector, EVN lacks investment capital. Therefore, big sums 
of private capital are needed. Consequently, several policies to support RE investments have 
been approved by the government. A RE FiT was put in place and the government plans to 
liberalize the currently highly restricted electricity market. Furthermore, there are RE 
deployment and CO2 reduction targets in place, also because Vietnam is one of the countries 
affected most by climate change worldwide. RE deployment can help to achieve the GHG 
reduction targets. It can also help to increase the bad air quality, the local population is 
negatively affected by. Without strong reliance on coal power plants the country would not get 
into a coal import dependency. A RE industry in Vietnam can bring the country many new 
jobs. The technical potential for sun and wind power is favourable for large and small-scale 
projects. Small-scale RE projects are also very promising in regions with no access to 
electricity yet.  
The main barriers are an intransparent permitting process with many actors involved, low 
electricity tariffs and subsidies for fossil fuels, old transmitting infrastructure and 
corruption. Table 5 lists opportunities and barriers RE investors in Vietnam face.  
Table 4: Opportunities and Barriers for Investors in Vietnam 
Opportunities for RE Deployment Barriers for RE Deployment 
Increasing electricity demand and 
Frequent power cuts 
Intransparent permitting process with many 
actors involved 
Investment into power capacity necessary Low electricity tariffs  
Main actor lacks capital Subsidies for fossil fuels 
RE support policies are in place 
e.g. FiT and an energy sector 
liberalization strategy 
RE deployment and GHG reduction 
targets are set 
Old transmitting infrastructure with losses 
Climate change and other environmental issues 
like bad air quality 
Highly regulated market 
Coal import dependence  Corruption 
New jobs through new RE industry  
Technical potential high  
Regions without access to electricity  
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5 Analysis  
This chapter contains an ex-post effectiveness analysis of current RE policies and an ex-post 
analysis of investment barriers. It answers research question 1: How conducive is Vietnam’s 
contextual setting to renewable energy investment? and identifies RE investment barriers. 
The ex-post effectiveness analysis of current policies analyses if implemented policies work 
successfully or if adjustments are needed. The assessment will be conducted by analyzing and 
comparing the officially set RE targets with the actual deployment rate.  
For the identification of barriers and de-risk instruments the barrier categories developed in this 
thesis were used. After the categorization of the barriers they are analysed in a structured way. 
Grading criteria for every single barrier were developed to find out which potential barriers are 
still real barriers in Vietnam. The approach uses grades from 1-3 to rate the application of de-
risk instruments. Ex post effectiveness analysis of current policies 
5.1 Ex post effectiveness analysis of current policies 
Vietnam has set RE targets and implemented several policies for the promotion of RE. In this 
section an ex-post evaluation of the effectiveness of the current policies will be conducted. Ex-
post evaluations are a way to give feedback and information about the impact of a policy. The 
evaluation also shows if the expected objectives are reached. Policy makers can learn from 
previous mistakes and successes through the evaluation. If the result of an ex-post analysis is 
negative, an adjustment of the evaluated policy is recommended (Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 
2015a); (European Parliament & Council, 2002). 
An instrument is effective if a set goal is achieved. In the energy sector, goals are usually stated 
in RE deployment in MW or share of RE in total energy generation (Vaz & European 
Environment Agency, 2001). Mickwitz (2006) explains the effectiveness analysis by asking: “to 
what degree do the achieved outcomes correspond to the intended goals of the policy?” 
(Mickwitz, 2003, p. 426). 
In the case of RE deployment it is still difficult to make an effectiveness analysis since the official 
Power Development Plan VII only contains targets for the years 2020 and 2030. However, it is 
possible to see a trend. For the analysis the elements output, outcome, impact and effectiveness 
will be used.  
Output  
The government’s output are several policies that try to increase the share of RE. The 
introduction of a FiT is an output as well as RE targets. The latest RE targets are part of the 
PDP VII.   
The “National Power Development Plan for the period 2011–2020 and looking forward to 
2030” (Decision 1208/2011/QD- TTg dated July 21, 2011) states that the RE share of total 
electricity generation in 2020 shall reach 4.5% in 2020 and 6% in 2030. The capacity of wind 
power plants is planned to reach 1000MW in 2020 (0.7% of total electricity capacity) and 6200 
MW in 2030 (2.4% of total electricity capacity).  
In 2016 the PDP VII was revised and a few changes were incorporated. The revised PDP with 
the decision number 428/QD-TTg dated March 18, 2016 and the name “Approval of the 
Revised National Power Development Master Plan for the 2011-2020 Period with the Vision 
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to 2030” states that the capacity of wind power plants is planned to reach 800 MW in 2020 
(0.8% of total electricity capacity) and 2000 MW in 2025 (1% of total electricity capacity) and 
6000 MW in 2030 (2.1% of total electricity capacity). In the revised document there are also 
goals for solar power deployment for the first time. The target for solar power capacity for 2020 
is 850 MW (0.5% of total capacity), 4,000 MW (1.6% of total capacity) in 2025 and 12,000 MW 
(3.3% of total capacity) in 2030.  
Outcome 
As a consequence of the governmental policies, only a few actors started investing in wind and 
solar energy projects.  
Impact 
These investments resulted in an impact that can be measured in MW. In 2016, four years 
after the approval of the PDP VII, 140 MW of wind power capacity were installed. From 2001 
until December 2015 52 MW (3 wind energy projects) were installed and connected to the grid 
(Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2016).  
In 2014, there were 4MW of installed PV in Vietnam. Most of it, about 80%, were used off-
grid, mainly in rural areas. The remaining 20% were connected to the national grid (Delegation 
of German Industry and Commerce in Vietnam, 2015). At the beginning of September 2015, 
the Vietnamese company “Thien Tan Company Limited” started constructing a 19.2 MW solar 
power project at a cost of US$40 million. It is expected to be on the grid by June 2016 (Nguyen 
Ninh Hai et al., 2015).  
Effectiveness  
The targets have a timeframe until 2020, which only allows to analyse a trend. However, the RE 
deployment rate since the introduction of the targets is low. The set targets for wind energy are 
1000MW/ 800 MW in 2020 while the installed capacity is 140MW. The government has reduced 
the official targets already, which also shows that the targets were too ambitious, given the 
prevalence of different barriers. The target for solar power capacity is 850 MW until the year 
2020. Currently there are less than 30 MW installed in Vietnam. Also, in the deployment of solar 
PV the governmental policies have not worked effectively.  
The low deployment rates show that the policies are not yet working sufficiently. Therefore, the 
policies should be readjusted. The barriers responsible for the low deployment rate will be 
assessed in section 5.2.  
5.2 Identification of Barriers and De-Risk Instruments 
Section 5.1 showed that the current policies are not effective yet. The RE targets will be difficult 
to reach without policy adjustments and enforcement. The current investment barriers need to 
be removed. In this section barriers found in literature and through interviews will be 
categorized in the barrier categories developed earlier in this thesis. The categories are market 
barriers, informational barriers, political barriers, administrative barriers, and technical barriers. 
The categories form the foundation of the analytical framework. Starting from the barrier 
categories, it is easy to find a specific barrier. From there it is possible to find a de-risk instrument 
that allows the removal of a barrier or risk. The process is visualized in figure 13.  
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Figure 13: Use of Framework- From Category to Instrument 
In a further step, an assessment was conducted that shows which barriers are not sufficiently 
covered by de-risk instruments yet. For each barrier category indicators were developed. The 
grading was done according to the findings from the literature and interviews. The approach 
uses grades from 1-3 to rate the application of de-risk instruments. 1 stands for barrier of high 
significance, 2 for barrier of medium significance, and 3 for barrier if low significance. The 
approach shows which potential barriers can be found in Vietnam. The grading shows where 
policy adjustments are needed most. Barriers that are rated as significant should be removed 
with policy instruments.  
The analysis of political barriers goes one step further. In this category the concrete instruments 
are analysed instead of the barriers. This is possible because the instruments (PPA, FiT, long-
term RE targets) are explained in detail in the given policies. This is not the case for other 
instruments. For example, the governmental effort to implement the instrument “streamline 
and simplify permitting process” is more difficult to assess than the current situation. For that 
reason, the situation is assessed and barriers disclosed. In a further step the barrier can be 
removed with a mix of policy instruments.  
Political Barriers 
In this section political barriers are analyzed and evaluated. The framework (see table 6) shows 
that there are three main barriers that can be found: a) insufficient cornerstone instruments b) 
volatile policies and c) insufficient R&D. The barrier “insufficient cornerstone instruments” can 
be removed by implementing or adjusting cornerstone instruments (power purchase 
agreements, FiTs/ price premiums). An instrument to improve volatile policies are long term 
(RE) targets and an instrument to improve insufficient R&D is to increase the R&D efforts. 
Table 7 shows the evaluation criteria for political barriers and figure 14 shows the results of the 
evaluation of the de-risk instruments for political barrier.  
Table 5: Political Barriers Evaluation Results  
Category Barrier Instrument Rating 
Political Insufficient cornerstone 
instruments 
Power Purchase Agreements (PPA) 
Feed-in Tariff (FiT) 
Price Premium 
2 
1 
n.a. 
Volatile policies Long-term (RE) Targets 3 
Insufficient R&D Increase R&D efforts n.a. 
Table 6: Political Barriers Evaluation Criteria  
Political Barriers 
1 - High significance 2 - Medium significance 3 - Low significance 
FiT does not cover 
investors costs 
FiT covers expenses FiT generates profit 
PPA does not reduce 
risks 
PPA partly reduces risks PPA reduces risks 
No long-term targets Low long-term targets High long-term targets 
Category Barrier Instrument
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Figure 14: Political Barriers De-Risk Instruments Evaluation Results 
Barrier: Insufficient Cornerstone Instruments 
Currently, there is a FiT with a remuneration rate of US$7.8 cents/kWh in Vietnam. 
Additionally, investors can sign a PPA with the local utility company EVN over the time span 
of 20 years. In order to better understand the situation and to be able to assess it, the following 
section is about the history of the FiT in Vietnam.  
History of FIT in Vietnam 
In 2004 there was a first attempt to promote RE by introducing regulations that included tax 
reductions for power project planners. However, there was no FiT, instead developers had to 
negotiate prices with the Vietnamese Energy Supplier (EVN) directly (Delegation of German 
Industry and Commerce in Vietnam, 2015).  
In 2009 a PPA coupled with an Avoided Cost Tariff (ACT)7 was introduced. The tariff was 
recalculated every year. Even though there was such a tariff, no wind energy project was 
developed. This was mainly caused by the low financial remuneration of only about US$4 
cents/kWh. For small- scale hydropower plants the tariff was more attractive. 
A change could be seen on June 29, 2011 when prime minister Dung approved the “decision 
on the Mechanism Supporting the Development of the Wind Power Project in Vietnam“ (No. 
37/2011/QD-TTg) (Delegation of German Industry and Commerce in Vietnam, 2015) that 
aims to support wind energy deployment.  
The decision introduced a general FiT of US$7.8 cents/kWh. Already in 2011, international 
experienced consultants suggested to implement a higher FiT of US$10.5 cents/kWh 
                                                 
7 Avoided cost describes a utilities expenses to produce one more unit of power 
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(Interviews). However, the Vietnamese government did not follow this advice. US$6.8 cents of 
the FIT are coming from the energy supplier EVN while the remaining US$1.0 cent are coming 
from the Vietnam Fund of Environment Protection (Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2011b). 
The regulation states that the electricity buyer, Vietnam Electricity Cooperation (EVN) has to 
purchase electricity generated by wind power projects, also from privately owned ones. A PPA 
between project developers and EVN over 20 years is now the standard procedure. The new 
FiT was partly introduced through the pressure of international donor agencies who lobbied for 
a better RE policy.  
Evaluation: Feed-in Tariff / Power Purchase Agreement 
It is positive that Vietnam has a FiT as well as the option of a PPA, however there are some 
shortcomings. All interviewees agreed that the current FiT is an insufficient cornerstone instrument 
because it is too low. For investors it is not financially viable to develop any large-scale RE 
projects (beside hydropower) that rely on the FiT at the current time. There are many wind 
power projects registered in Vietnam but not carried out yet because of the low remuneration. 
All registered projects have a total capacity of 4252 MW. They are in the “development phase” 
but they are said to be “on hold” (Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2011b). Project developers 
articulated interest and started the development of projects on paper. By officially becoming the 
project developer of an attractive location with strong winds, other investors cannot claim the 
land anymore. Project developers who put their projects “on hold” profit from this 
circumstance and wait for better remuneration schemes. It is expected that once there is a higher 
remuneration scheme, these projects will be constructed and connected to the grid.  
For that reason, the current deployment rate of wind power projects is low (see chapter 5.1). 
Until today there is only one wind energy project in Vietnam that was carried out with the FiT 
as the main support instrument. All other wind energy projects were highly subsidized by 
international donors, such as the German development bank KfW. For example, a project 
supported by the KfW received a loan over 35 million Euros with an interest rate below market 
standard. Therefore, the electricity generated is a lot cheaper than it would be without external 
support.  
Several interview partners mentioned that the main reason for the low tariff is the fear of high 
costs: especially the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MOIT) is concerned about increasing 
prices. EVN worries that higher tariffs would lead to questions about their efficiency. The state-
owned enterprise had already to fight critics in the past. Most Vietnamese consumers are rather 
price-sensitive. For reasons of public pressure, it is difficult to increase electricity prices in 
Vietnam in general. The described price increases (see chapter “Electricity Rates”) in the last 
decade were mainly inflationary adjustments and did not help EVN much in the aim to increase 
their funds. 
The PPA is considered to be positive. However, even though the design of the PPA is of 
international standard, it does not solve the barrier completely. EVN is a highly indebted SOE. 
That makes EVN a difficult contract partner for project developers. Especially banks lack trust 
in EVN’s finances, which drives up interest rates, even though there is a 20 years PPA signed.  
The evaluation result for the FiT is: High significance. The FiT does not cover investors’ 
costs. 
The evaluation result for the PPA is: Medium significance. The PPA partly reduces risks. 
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Barrier: Volatile Policies 
In Vietnam there are several official targets that are directly or indirectly related to the RE sector 
and try to lower the risk of volatile policies. There are GHG reduction targets, RE targets and 
GHG reduction targets specifically for the electricity sector. 
At the international level, Vietnam committed to reduce its overall GHG emissions as part of 
the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs). Vietnam’s INDCs in terms of 
GHG reductions are 8% by 2030, respectively up to 25% by 2030 if international actors support 
the development (Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2015d). 
Furthermore, there are targets to reduce GHG emissions in the electricity sector by 5% until 
2020, 25% till 2030 and 45% till 2050 compared to BAU (Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2015d). 
There are several targets for the deployment and share of RE in Vietnam. The government set 
goals for the years 2020, 2025, 2030 and 2050. The wind power capacity is planned to reach 800 
MW in 2020, 2000 MW in 2025 and 6000 MW in 2030 (Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2016). 
The targets for solar power deployment 850 MW in 2020, 4,000 MW in 2025 and 12,000 MW 
in 2030.  
Evaluation: Long-term (RE) Targets 
According to several interviewees, the INDCs and in particular the GHG reduction goals sound 
more ambitious than they are. The 8% reduction is a BAU scenario (on total numbers). Experts 
say that the BAU scenario uses rather ambitious economic growth rates.  
Nevertheless, the goals might have an impact already. A media article states that starting from 
spring 2016 new gas fired power plants will be favoured over coal power plants (Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam, 2015b). It says that at the beginning of 2016 the prime minister Nguyen 
Tan Dung appointed the Ministry of Industry and Trade to review the current Power 
Development Plan. The current plan foresees an increase of the capacity of coal power plans. 
Premier Dung was concerned about the high GHG emissions, emitted by coal power plants 
and the consequently difficulties to achieve the submitted INDCs (Viet Nam Energy, 2016). 
This shows that even though the INDCs are voluntary, they do put some pressure on the 
government since the government’s goal is to receive money from international donors for 
achieving their GHG targets.  
Building new coal power plants would be contradicting and make it difficult to achieve the 
INDC target as well as the power sector GHG reduction target.  
The long-term targets for the deployment of RE are considered as positive. However, 
concerning the actual numbers of the targets, there are different opinions among the experts. 
Most of the interviewees thought positive about them. They considered them as modest and 
achievable, while others said they are not high enough yet and others said they are not 
achievable.  
Furthermore, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam also set the long-term goals to establish its own 
RE manufacturing industry in Vietnam. The plan is to manufacture wind turbines within the 
country to create jobs. Experts are sceptical if Vietnam will manage to achieve this goal. 
Especially the proximity to China where RE technology is already produced makes it difficult 
for Vietnam. 
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Overall, most interview partners agreed that Vietnam has stable policies and a safe investment 
climate. Nevertheless, the current targets need more regulative adjustments and more detailed 
implementation strategies, otherwise the goals will not be achieved.  
The evaluation result for the long-term targets is: Low significance. There are high long-term 
targets. 
Administrative Barriers  
In this section administrative barriers will be analyzed and evaluated. The framework (see table 
8) shows that there is one main barrier “permitting process” that can be negatively influenced 
by one or more sub-barriers. The sub-barriers are: a) diffusion of information b) communication 
among actors c) cooperation among actors d) corruption.  
The barriers can be removed or decreased by applying a mix of instruments that have the aim 
to streamline and simplify the permitting process. The instruments available are a) streamline 
and simplify permitting process b) restructure responsibilities and processes c) trainings d) 
communicating responsibilities. Table 9 shows the evaluation criteria of the administrative 
barriers and figure 15 shows the evaluation results. 
Table 7: Administrative Barriers Evaluation Results 
Category Barrier Instrument Rating 
Administrative Permitting process Streamline and simplify permitting 
process 
Restructure responsibilities and 
processes 
Trainings for staff 
Communicate responsibilities 
1 
Diffusion of 
information  
1 
Communication 
among actors 
1 
Cooperation among 
actors 
1 
Corruption 1 
Table 8: Administrative Barriers Evaluation Criteria 
Administrative Barriers 
3 - low significance 2 - medium significance 1 - high significance 
Easy and fast permitting process Mostly easy and fast permitting 
process 
Difficult and slow permitting 
process 
Good diffusion of information Mediocre diffusion of information Insufficient diffusion of 
information 
Good and efficient communication 
among actors 
Mediocre communication among 
actors 
Insufficient and inefficient 
communication among actors 
Good cooperation among actors Mediocre cooperation among 
actors 
Insufficient cooperation among 
actors 
No corruption Little corruption Corruption is common  
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Figure 15: Administrative Barriers Evaluation Results 
Evaluation: Permitting process 
The current permitting process is complex and time-consuming, it is not transparent and involves 
many actors as described in chapter 4.2 “Permitting Process”. It is one of the main obstacles 
for a more rapid RE deployment in Vietnam and was one of the most mentioned barriers by 
the interviewed experts. 
The interviews showed that developers often do not know who is responsible. There is missing 
diffusion of information about clear responsibilities and the permitting process involves many steps 
and actors such as the PC, DOIT, DPI, MOIT, local communities and others. That makes the 
processes inefficient and non-transparent. It lacks clear policies, responsibilities and the 
communication of such. The fact that the permitting process for wind power projects varies 
from province to province makes it even more difficult for investors and project developers.  
The major problems are missing cooperation among actors and insufficient communication. At the 
provincial and local level there is a lack of recognition of national laws and regulations. The 
national authorities set targets for RE deployment and develop the support framework without 
sufficient inclusion of local and regional stakeholders. At the local level, actors are partly 
responsible for the permitting of projects. At this level people are affected by new RE projects 
and therefore ask for participation in the planning process. A nation-wide FiT often lacks the 
needed cooperation between different governmental levels. Interviews showed that a law signed 
by the prime minister and therewith by the highest governmental representative is not per se 
accepted by local governments. Instead a national law is rather understood as an “idea” than as 
a fact. After the approval of a national law, it has to be implemented in the regional/ local 
context by signing a decree. Before this has happened, the national law is not recognized. That 
leads to many misunderstandings and misinterpretations of national law at the local level. If a 
project developer approaches an authority at the local level, the process depends on the 
authority’s interpretation of the national law. 
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In particular, in the matter of centrally planned land use there are constantly overlapping plans 
among different actors. Interview partners complained about them; for example, big parts of 
Vietnam’s land are taken for resource exploitation like mining and the growing of crops and are 
therefore not available for RE projects anymore. Wind power project developers experience 
difficulties changing these plans, especially if a site is not in the National Power Development 
Plan yet. Developers have to apply to get it into the PDP, which is an unclear, time-consuming 
process that needs the support of national consultants. Vertical integrated planning and 
consistent planning with actors of all levels is missing.  
Interviews revealed that in Vietnam nepotism and corruption are widespread. In most cases it is 
most important to know someone influential who holds a forceful position, for example in 
regional or local politics. Additionally, bribes are common. Interviewees mentioned that money 
is often paid to obtain necessary permits. Corruption is amplified by the high number of actors 
involved and the obscure structure. 
The evaluation result for the permitting process is: High significance. The permitting process 
is difficult and slow. 
The evaluation result for the diffusion of information is: High significance. The diffusion of 
information is insufficient. 
The evaluation result for the communication among actors is: High significance. The 
communication is insufficient and inefficient. 
The evaluation result for the cooperation among actors is: High significance. The cooperation 
is insufficient.  
The evaluation result for corruption is: High significance. Corruption is common.  
Market Barriers 
In this section market barriers will be analyzed and evaluated. The framework shows (see table 
10) that there are several barriers such as a) controlled market, with the sub-barrier “subsidies 
on fossil fuels”. Furthermore, there are the barriers b) access to capital c) public support.  
The barriers can be removed or decreased by applying a mix of instruments that have the aim 
to improve the market and financial conditions. There are various instruments available such as 
a) liberalization of the market b) remove fossil fuel subsidies c) financial instruments (gap 
funding, public equity co-investments, loan guarantees, public loans/ soft loans, carbon offset, 
tax credits) d) trainings. Table 11 show the evaluation criteria for market barriers and figure 16 
the evaluation results.  
Table 9: Market Barrier Instruments and Evaluation Results 
Category Barrier Instrument Rating 
Market Related Controlled Market Liberalize market 2 
Fossil fuel subsidies Remove fossil fuel subsidies 2 
Access to capital 
 
 
Gap funding 
Public equity co-investments 
Trainings  
Public loans/ soft loans 
Loan guarantees 
Carbon Offset 
Tax Credits 
1 
Public support 
 
2 
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Table 10: Market Barriers Evaluation Criteria 
Market Barriers 
3 - low significance 2 - medium significance 1 - high significance 
Liberal market  Closed market with liberal 
elements 
Closed Market 
No fossil fuel subsidies Low fossil fuel subsidies High fossil fuel subsidies 
Easy access to capital Mediocre access to capital  Difficult access to capital 
High public support Some public support Low public support 
 
 
Figure 16: Market Barriers Evaluation Results 
Evaluation: Controlled Market 
The electricity market in Vietnam is highly regulated. It is a closed market with only few liberal 
elements (e.g. private companies are allowed to produce electricity). The main actor in the 
energy sector is the State Owned Enterprise EVN. The company has a monopoly on the 
electricity grid and owns most of the generation capacity. The electricity prices do not reflect 
the actual costs for the generation and distribution but are set by governmental organizations.  
Furthermore, there are fossil fuel subsidies in place that promote the use of coal for energy 
generation. The fossil fuel subsidies make RE in comparison more expensive.  
The Vietnamese government approved a decision that aims to restructure the energy sector. 
The plan is to liberalize the electricity market and to establish a competitive market. 
Furthermore, the latest official governmental strategy states, that the RE deployment will be 
“based on market instruments”. However, experts are not convinced by the news yet.  
The evaluation result for the Market is: Medium significance. The market is closed with liberal 
elements. 
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Evaluation: Access to capital / Public support 
The access to capital for RE projects in Vietnam is difficult. The Vietnamese government gives 
out public loans/ soft loans with low interest rates that investors can apply for. Soft loans are known 
to be a good instrument to simplify access to capital and decrease the financial costs at the same 
time. However, at the moment these loans are not effective. Interview partners stated, that the 
loans are granted to those investors who pay the most to the administration issuing them. Even 
though the interest rates are low, the loans have to be “bought”, which drives up the costs. 
In Vietnam it is still difficult to get loans for RE projects (except hydropower) from commercial 
banks. Most of them are rather small and have difficulties to offer loans large enough to finance 
large-scale RE projects. Furthermore, the staff at banks is lacking know-how on RE 
investments, which drives up the interest rates.  
In addition to the soft loans, the Vietnamese government installed several other public support 
instruments. The indirect financial support mechanisms are a) tax exemptions on import duties 
for any technology needed that is not produced within the country b) free land or a reduced 
land lease fee c) tax exemptions on corporate income tax for the first 1- 4 years, and a 50% tax 
reduction for the next 5-13 years d) the option to sell Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
certificates. These instruments are considered to be helpful and good for investors.  
 
However, iinterview partners mentioned that the lack of governmental loan guarantees is a 
problem. This is in particular a problem because of the EVN’s negative financial balance. 
Having the highly indebted company EVN as a contract partner drives up the perceived risks. 
Until today the company has always paid, however, the perceived risk increases due to its debt.  
 
At the global level there are several financial policy instruments and multilateral initiatives that 
aim to shift risks from investors to public actors (Viet Nam Energy, 2016; Micale et al., 2013). 
For example, there is the World Bank agency Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA) that offers policy risk insurance for investors in developing countries. The insurance 
covers losses that happen due to government’s breach of a contract with investors(e.g. if a PPA 
is changed) (Micale et al., 2013; UNEP, 2004). Furthermore there is the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation (OPIC) for US investors. Another financial de-risking instrument by 
the World Bank is a partial risk guarantee that was introduced in 1994 (Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency, 2016). A relatively new tool is the OPIC FiT insurance, which covers 
retroactive policy risks. However, this tool is for US investors only.  
Interview partners were aware of the global de-risk instruments but expressed concerns about 
the bureaucracy of them, which is said to be cumbersome. A main shortcoming is the time-
consuming endorsement process in the case of broken contracts. That process can take up to 
several years, a timespan small investment companies cannot wait for. For this reason, only 
large, financially strong investors can rely on them.  
The evaluation result for access to capital is: High significance. It is difficult to access capital. 
The evaluation result for public support is: Medium significance. There is some public support. 
Informational Barriers 
In this section informational barriers will be analyzed and evaluated. The framework shows (see 
table 12) that there are several barriers such as a) availability of know-how b) access to reliable 
information c) skilled labour d) social acceptance. 
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The barriers can be removed or decreased by applying a mix of instruments that have the aim 
to improve the level of information within the country. There are various instruments available 
such as a) increase R&D b) improve access to reliable information c) communicate 
responsibilities d) improve O&M skills e) improve RE social acceptance/ support f) trainings 
for staff g) restructure responsibilities h) improve cooperation among actors. Table 13 shows 
the evaluation criteria for informational barriers and figure 17 the evaluation results.  
Table 11: Informational Barrier Instruments and Evaluation Results 
Barrier Category Barrier Instrument Rating 
Informational Availability of know-
how 
Increase R&D 
Improve access to 
reliable information 
Communicate 
responsibilities 
Improve O&M skills  
Improve RE social 
acceptance/ support 
Trainings for staff 
Restructure 
responsibilities 
Improve cooperation 
among actors 
1 
Access to reliable 
information 
2 
Skilled labour 1 
Social acceptance 2 
Table 12: Informational Barriers Evaluation Criteria 
Informational Barriers 
3 - low significance 2 - medium significance 1 - high significance 
Know-how available  Mediocre know-how Little know-how 
Easy access to information Mediocre access to information Difficult access to information 
Skilled labour available Few skilled labour  Lack of skilled labour  
High social acceptance Somewhat social acceptance No social acceptance 
 
Windy Times in Emerging Economies 
59 
 
 
Figure 17: Informational Barriers Evaluation Results 
Evaluation: Availability of know-how/ Access to reliable information 
In Vietnam there is little know-how about RE in the country. Most interview partners complained 
about missing information for investors, in particular, they miss a) unambiguous official 
governmental information b) wind speed data c) reports by practitioners. 
For developers it is difficult to obtain reliable information from governmental actors. Even 
though there might be information available, it is not always clear and leaves room for 
interpretation. For example, there are no national policies but different regulations in the 
different provinces because on the provincial level there are different interpretations of national 
policies. The permitting process is not straightforward, official governmental information and 
responsibilities are often not obvious.  
In terms of wind speed data there are not enough reliable studies and the wind speed data available 
is not of high quality, nor quantity. Measurements have been taken at fewer than 30 sites across 
the country, which is not enough to get a comprehensive picture of the wind power potential 
in Vietnam. Also, the way the measurements were taken in the past is problematic. For example, 
the World Bank obtained its data by measuring the wind speeds only 4 times per day. Additional 
issues are insufficiently trained wind measurement staff and possibly external influences by 
curious citizens who disturb the measurements. Today, several institutions such as the KfW, 
World Bank and GIZ collaborate in order to build up a database with reliable wind speed 
measurements.  
There are several international organizations involved in improving the investment situation for 
RE in Vietnam. For example, there is the Asian Development Bank (ADB), World Bank (WB), 
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), KfW, GIZ, Swedish International 
Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) and UNDP. Some actors are just starting to work in 
the field of energy while others are already experienced. For example, the delegation of the EU 
now focuses on the energy sector and plans to spend significant amounts of money (more than 
400 Million Euros until 2020) on energy-related projects in Vietnam, however they are a new 
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player and still learning. On the other hand, there are actors like the GIZ that has already been 
involved in energy related topic in Vietnam for many years.  
Important for successful and efficient work is the information exchange among actors 
(internationals as well as locals). A new project by the EU delegation aims to support this idea. 
They are in the process of establishing an energy group with international and national actors. 
The Vietnamese governmental will be represented by the MOIT. 
The research for this thesis revealed that the project would be highly beneficial. Talking to 
different actors in the field showed that often employees of one organization were not aware of 
the work of other organizations.  
The evaluation result for Availability of Know-how is: High significance. Little know-how is 
available.  
The evaluation result for Access to Reliable Information is: Medium significance. There is a 
mediocre access to information. 
Barrier: Missing skilled labor 
There is a lack of skilled labour in all renewable energy-related areas from the government to the 
private sector. There should be more knowledge among governmental officials, interviewees 
said. Currently there are only few officials who already have expertise on the topic and they 
mostly work in Ha Noi for the central government. At the provincial level there is an even 
stronger lack of knowledge among governmental officials.  
Also in the private sector there is a lack of skilled labour. For example, there is a need for experts 
who can consult developers in the permit process. Also local banks should have more 
knowledge in order to be able to design suitable financial products for wind and solar 
developers. In addition, there is a lack of knowledge and human capital in the field of operations 
and maintenance. 
Currently there are no university programs in Vietnam that focus on the topic of RE. Due to 
the few projects that have been carried out so far, there is also a lack of experienced practitioners 
who could share their knowledge.  
The evaluation result for skilled labour is: High significance. Skilled labour is missing.  
Barrier: Missing social acceptance 
The social acceptance of large-scale RE projects is considered to be high. The interviews revealed 
that there are no problems like NIMBY movements in Vietnam. Wind power plants are 
considered as an indicator for industrial/ economic development, which is seen as something 
positive by the population. For this reason, most Vietnamese are in favour of wind and solar 
power plants.  
However, the social acceptance could even be improved if all citizens would know about the 
technology. Many people are still not aware of RE. Publicity campaigns could help to increase 
the demand of the technology. 
The evaluation result for social acceptance is: Low significance. Overall social acceptance is 
high.  
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Technical Barriers 
This thesis does not cover the analysis of technical barriers because most interview partners 
were not aware of them. However, some have brought up concerns about pressure on the grid 
through higher shares of volatile RE. The fluctuating energy is more difficult to manage than 
coal power plants. Therefore, fast RE deployment can distort the grid stability. The national 
grid is old which makes investments in the grid essential.  
5.3 Barriers Summary  
The analysis in this chapter allows answering research question 1: How conducive is Vietnam’s 
contextual setting to renewable energy investment? This chapter showed that there are still several 
investment barriers for large-scale wind and solar developers. The use of the framework and the 
evaluation criteria allowed uncovering the biggest investment barriers.  
Table 14 shows the main barriers found in literature and found through interviews. Table 15 
shows the barrier categories, barriers, possible instruments to reduce barriers and the evaluation 
results for the barriers. In the political barriers category, the FiT has major deficiencies. The 
administrative barriers are immense. The permitting process is complex and time consuming, 
diffusion of information as well as the communication and cooperation among actors is 
insufficient. On top of this grave barriers, corruption is omnipresent. The biggest market barrier 
is the difficulties of access to capital and the gravest information barriers are a lack of RE know-
how and a lack of skilled labor.  
However, the previous chapter showed that the climatic conditions in Vietnam are favorable 
for RE projects. There is enough wind and sun for large-scale RE projects. However, at the 
moment, the contextual setting is not conducive. In the next chapter policy scenarios will be 
presented to answer research question 2: What are possible ways to de-risk renewable energy investments 
in Vietnam? 
Table 13: Mayor Barriers in Vietnam Overview 
Barriers found in literature Barriers most mentioned in interviews 
Permitting process FiT 
Highly regulated market Permitting process 
Subsidies for fossil fuels Diffusion of information 
Low electricity tariffs Communication and cooperation among actors 
Old transmitting infrastructure with losses Corruption 
Corruption Access to capital 
 Lack of knowledge 
 Lack of skilled labour 
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Table 14: Barrier Categories, Barriers and Corresponding De-Risk Instruments 
Barrier Category Barrier Instrument Rating 
Political Insufficient cornerstone 
instruments 
Power Purchase 
Agreements (PPA) 
Feed-in Tariff (FiT) 
Price Premium 
2 
1 
n.a. 
Volatile policies Long-term (RE) Targets 3 
Insufficient R&D Increase R&D efforts n.a. 
Administrative Permitting process Streamline and simplify 
permitting process 
Restructure 
responsibilities and 
processes 
Trainings for staff 
Communicate 
responsibilities 
1 
Diffusion of 
information  
1 
Communication 
among actors 
1 
Cooperation 
among actors 
1 
Corruption 1 
Market Related Controlled Market Liberalize market 2 
Fossil fuel 
subsidies 
Remove fossil fuel 
subsidies 
2 
Access to capital 
 
 
 
 
 
Gap funding 
Public equity co-
investments 
Trainings  
Public loans/ soft loans 
Loan guarantees 
Carbon offset 
Tax credits 
1 
Informational Availability of know-how Increase R&D 
Improve access to reliable 
information 
Communicate 
responsibilities 
Improve O&M skills  
Improve RE social 
acceptance/ support 
Trainings for staff 
Restructure 
responsibilities 
1 
Access to reliable 
information 
2 
Skilled labour 1 
Social acceptance 2 
Missing diffusion of 
information 
1 
Technical No national wide standard Implement national wide 
standard 
n.a. 
Old infrastructure Improve infrastructure n.a. 
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6 Policy Scenarios  
This chapter in an ex-ante analysis that answers research question #2: What are possible ways to de-
risk renewable energy investments in Vietnam? Five policy scenarios were developed are presented. 
The scenarios work as alternatives to current policies. This section builds upon the findings of 
Chapter 5.  
The identification of barriers showed that there are still many barriers even though the 
government declares it is committed to RE deployment. Nevertheless, a political barrier is the 
current FiT that is not designed appropriately and therefore does not decrease investment risks. 
Additional to the political barriers there are administrative and informational barriers that 
hinder the deployment of large scale RE projects in Vietnam. The permitting process is 
cumbersome, there is little diffusion of information, a lack of communication and 
cooperation among actors. Furthermore, there is corruption that is amplified by the high 
number of actors involved in the permitting process and the intransparent structures. 
Additionally, there is a lack of RE know-how and skilled labor. 
The scenarios show different de-risk options and their advantages as well as disadvantages. 
Applying de-risk strategies goes hand in hand with the official governmental position. The 
Renewable Energy Strategy states: “Barriers shall be gradually removed and 
mechanisms/incentives shall be promulgated to encourage the appropriate RE development for 
rapid generation of RE sources“ (Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2015b, p. 2). 
Five different policy scenarios will be assessed:  
1. Increased FiT 
2. Auctioning System 
3. Improved Access to Capital 
4. Trainings 
5. Increase Cooperation among Actors 
Scenario 1: Increase FiT 
Currently the FiT for wind energy in Vietnam is US$7.8 cents/kWh. Most, if not all international 
actors in Vietnam involved in RE, propagate for a higher FiT. Already in 2011, experienced 
international consultants suggested to implement a higher FiT of US$10.5 cents/kWh. EVN 
and the government fear high costs and increasing electricity tariffs with an increased FiT. 
However, unofficial studies by one of the international actors showed that increasing the FiT 
would hardly have any negative impact on the general electricity price in Vietnam. If the 
government and EVN want to make sure that the electricity price does not increase, a capacity 
cap or a budget cap should be installed. In this way the government could ensure that not too 
many large-scale RE projects are developed at the same time. However, in this case, 
manufacturers would also hesitate producing in Vietnam, depending on the cap. 
The main advantage of higher a FiT is that it is very easy to implement. The current system 
would not change; however, more money would be paid. This would attract more RE investors 
from all over the world due to income security. It is likely that the RE deployment rate increases 
since investors have higher incentives to invest in the country. Once investments are made, it is 
possible that RE manufacturers start manufacturing in Vietnam and that an industry develops within 
the country.  
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The main negative aspect about this approach is, that the higher FiT would not change the deep-
rooted problems explained in chapter 5. Especially the cumbersome permitting process with many actors 
and corruption involved would not be changed. That means that the public/ electricity consumers 
would have to pay more for electricity. A higher FiT would lead to distributional effects and 
possibly increase income and wealth disparities. A better solution for the Vietnamese population 
are structural changes that end corruption.   
Scenario 2: Auctioning System  
Another successful instrument is auctioning systems. They are led to remarkable RE 
deployment in many other countries. Even though only two interview partners mentioned 
auctioning systems at all and none of them was prone to support it, it might be suitable for 
decreasing RE investment risks in Vietnam.  
Auctioning systems have several advantages. For example, the described problem (see chapter 
XX) of finding the right price cannot occur in an auctioning system since potential investors 
bid. If the government is concerned about too high prices per kWh/MW the design can include 
a maximum price. The advantage of auctions is that EVN already knows before the construction 
starts how much money they will have to spend for a defined installed capacity of RE. By 
decreasing entrance barriers and making the bidding and the deployment easy, competition 
among investors will increase, which may bring down the price of projects. The main problem 
in the current system is the cumbersome permitting process with many actors and corruption 
involved. Auctions can change this as described in the two option below.  
However, the auctioning system approach has a few possible disadvantages too. With a good 
policy design these can be avoided. One question is whether there would be enough competition 
among investors in Vietnam after the introduction of the auctioning system. In order to assure 
competition, the auctions should be promoted globally. Once investors notice the system works 
well, more investors will show interest, bid and lower the prices per MW.  
In order to prevent under-bidders, penalties should be included in the auctioning system (see 
chapter 2.2). The aim of penalties is to prevent long construction delays. However, import 
difficulties of technology might lead to delays anyways. If the developer is not responsible for 
the delay, no penalties should be applied. Another possible disadvantage stated in the literature 
is that for countries with auctioning systems, it is more difficult to attract manufacturers and to 
build up a national manufacturing industry for RE technologies.  
There are different design options for auctioning systems. The following two are presented: 
Option A is a Conventional Auctioning System and option B is a new design, developed in this 
thesis, the One Stop Auctioning System. 
Option A/ Conventional Auctioning System 
One of the main barriers for RE investments in Vietnam is the lack of communication between 
the national and the provincial government. The National Energy Strategy is developed by the 
central government in Hanoi without including local or regional governments. Currently, there 
are many cases of misunderstandings and misinterpretations of national law at the local level. If 
a project developer approaches an authority at the local level, the further process depends on 
the authority’s interpretation of the national law. This insecurity for investors can be avoided by 
integrating the provincial and local governments from the beginning, instead of having a pure 
top-down approach. Once authorities at the local level have selected a site, it can be approved 
by the national government and EVN. EVN (the grid operator) can then check, prior to an 
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investment, if a project is feasible or if grid improvements have to be implemented. After all 
actors have agreed on a site, an auction can be carried out for the pre-identified sites. That eases 
the permitting process since local actors are involved from the very beginning and are well 
informed.  
Developers can be sure the permitting process will be fast and easy. By introducing an 
auctioning system, developers have to deal with fewer actors, which decreases the opportunities 
for corruption. Even though developers have an additional bidding process, which is time 
consuming, the overall development will be less risky since it is simpler, faster and cheaper.  
Option B/ One Stop Auctioning System 
Another, even easier and therefore less risky option for developers is the One Stop Auctioning 
System. This approach cannot be found in the literature yet, because it is one of the results of 
this thesis.  
A One Stop Auctioning System is a conventional auctioning system with a special feature. The 
auctioning itself is as described in the literature review. However, investors bid for a “ready to 
go” site, which means that the land come already with a permit for a RE project. In this way 
investors can directly start construction without any long-lasting permitting processes. Official 
governmental actors do the permitting process before investors/ developers get involved.  
One option to achieve this is for the government to buy a suitable piece of land and give it to 
the developer either for free or for a fee. That way the developer can focus on the technology, 
operation & maintenance and financing of the RE project. Uncertainties in land ownership and 
difficulties in the permitting process could be avoided. The sunk costs for pre-construction 
activities are reduced to the bidding process. This new approach streamlines the processes and 
reduces uncertainties for investors in terms of administration (e.g. delays in the permitting 
process) and speeds up RE deployment. 
Scenario 3: Increase Access to Capital 
A reason for high interest rates and therefore investment costs are the perceived risks of signing 
a PPA with EVN. EVN is a SOE which is highly indebted. Banks, international as well as 
national, do not acknowledge the fact that EVN has always paid the agreed amount in a timely 
manner and would rather prefer them to have a positive balance sheet. However, that is not a 
short-term goal and even difficult to achieve as a long-term goal.  
Option B: Foundation of new Electricity Purchase Entity 
An option to increase the security and therewith decrease the interest rates, is to set up a new 
organization that buys electricity from RE developers. The organization’s responsibility would 
buy electricity from RE projects and to sell it to the grid utility.  
International actors as well as the EVN would have to help fund this organization in the 
beginning. Since there are currently only a few large-scale RE projects in Vietnam, no 
exceptional high amount would be required. Once the organization has enough money to pay 
electricity from RE generators for a few years in advance and indicate a stable income through 
the sales of electricity, banks will react by lowering the interest rates.  
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Option A: Loan Guarantees 
Another way to decrease the risk is to provide loan guarantees. A loan guarantee shifts risks 
from private investors to public actors, such as governments and ministries, bilateral aid 
agencies, export credit agencies and Development Financial Institutions (DFI). No structural 
changes are made but a shift of risks, which leads to an almost immediate decrease of risks and 
therefore lower interest rates. Limited and unlimited loan guarantees are one way of financial de-
risking. A public actor can assure that in case an investor cannot repay an official loan, the public 
party does (partially or the whole amount). Loan guarantees increase the security for banking 
institutes and therewith decrease interest rates.  
However, currently neither the Vietnamese government, nor other actors provide such a 
guarantee. Therefore, a public actor should offer such a loan guarantee for investors. In order 
to make this instrument also helpful for investors with limited financial resources, the process 
of the guarantee, which included the approval of it, should be fast and rather non-bureaucratic.  
Scenario 4: Increase Skilled Workforce 
There is a lack of skilled labour in all renewable energy-related areas from the government to 
the private sector. More knowledge among governmental officials would strike possible 
prejudices against RE and help them to better understand the advantages and possibilities. At 
the moment there are some knowledgeable officials working for the central government in 
Hanoi. However, at the provincial level there is a strong lack of knowledge among governmental 
officials. Also in the private sector there is a lack of skilled labour. For example, there is a need 
for experts who can consult developers in the permit process.  
Also local banks should have more knowledge in order to be able to design suitable financial 
products for wind and solar developers. It is still difficult to get loans for RE projects (except 
hydropower) from commercial banks. Most of them are rather small and have difficulties to 
offer loans big enough to finance large-scale RE projects. Furthermore, the staff is lacking 
know-how on RE investments, which drives up the interest rates.  
In the field of operations and maintenance there is a lack of knowledge and human capital too. 
In Vietnam there are currently no university programs that focus on the topic of RE.  
Excessive training, mainly provided by international actors, on topics related to RE should be 
carried out for all sectors and levels. For example, more knowledge about RE in the banking 
sector could directly influence the investment environment. There should be workshops about 
financial products for RE investors. Politicians from different regions and levels should learn 
from other countries and should learn about the advantages of RE.  
Scenario 5: Increase Cooperation/ Communication Among Actors 
Cooperation and communication among actor is key for any undertaking. The analysis has 
shown, that there is a lack of cooperation among actors and insufficient communication. 
Currently a top-down approach is used for the development of RE projects. That leads to a lack 
of recognition of national laws and regulations on the local levels. The national authorities set 
targets for RE deployment and develop the support framework without sufficient inclusion of 
local and regional stakeholders. There are many cases of misunderstandings and 
misinterpretations of national law on the local level. If a project developer approaches an 
authority on the local level, the further process depends on the authority’s interpretation of the 
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national law and eventually on bribes.  
In order to strengthen the cooperation and communication among the official actors, a bottom-
up approach should be introduced. By incentivizing the local level to have RE projects in their 
communities, they will be more open towards investors. Regional governments should apply 
with possible sites at the national level. In case they win and their site gets selected they should 
benefit financially. 
6.1 Discussion of Scenarios and Policy Recommendation  
The last section answered the question What are possible ways to de-risk renewable energy investments in 
Vietnam? Five different options where presented, 1) increased FiT 2) auctioning system 3) 
improved access to capital 4) more skilled labour 5) increase cooperation among actors. In this 
section the different policy scenarios will be discussed and a policy recommendation will be 
given.  
The access to capital can be improved by minimizing risks. This can be achieved by loan 
guarantees, or the foundation of a new electricity purchase entity. Loan guarantees are easier to 
implement than establishing a new organisation. For that reason, it might be more 
recommendable to implement these guarantees. Because of the simplicity of the instrument they 
should be a priority in the future de-risking mix. 
The increase of skilled labour can be achieved with more trainings. In order to achieve a 
strong RE sector in Vietnam, the diffusion of knowledge is needed on all levels. The amount of 
trainings should increase. International actors train locals already but the high lack of skilled 
people shows that the efforts are still not enough. Trainings at all sectors, from governmental 
actors to private sector actors will help to create a better investment climate. Trainings will 
achieve that policy makers have a better understanding about RE technologies and their 
advantages, banks can create products that suit RE projects and project developers can hire 
locals for O&M. 
An increased cooperation among official actors would help to ease permitting processes for 
investors. By introducing a more bottom-up approach with benefits for the local level, investors 
will be more welcomed to develop projects.  
Beside the policy scenarios three, four and five there are also the options of increasing the FiT 
(scenario 1) and introducing an auctioning system (scenario 2). International actors have 
been lobbying for higher FiT for many years already. Among the experts in Vietnam this is the 
most favored solution. It is likely that higher FiT would have a positive impact on RE 
deployment rates as experts say. This is because the higher remuneration per kWh decreases the 
risk of financial losses for investors. However, one of the mayor RE investment barriers in 
Vietnam is administrative (e.g. corruption). A higher FiT would not solve this problem. This 
raises the concern: would a higher FiT lead to more corruption and higher bribes? This is 
uncertain and to investigate the topic of corruption would go beyond the scope of this thesis. 
However, if the bribes increase the energy transition would come at a high cost for the mostly 
poor population. In that case electricity consumers would pay indirectly for corrupt officials. 
Therefore, it could be a better option to change the cornerstone instrument instead of holding 
on to a FiT.  
An instrument mix, designed around an auctioning system could change the current situation 
and also the deep-rooted problem of corruption. There can also be corruption and bribes in 
auctioning systems, however, as described in chapter 6n, in such a system developers have to 
deal with fewer actors, especially in the policy scenario Option B/ One Stop Auctioning System. 
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Nevertheless, in order to avoid corruption during the auctions, it has to be assured that the 
bidding process is as transparent as possible.  
In literature there are also other disadvantages of auctioning systems mentioned. One example 
is, that it is usually more difficult to attract manufacturers to start manufacturing locally. 
However, in the case of Vietnam the current FiT does not lead to high deployment rates. The 
deployment rates could be a lot higher with a well working auctioning system and this is the 
most important factor for manufacturers. This means that a well working auctioning system 
could actually be more attractive for manufacturers then a poorly working FiT.  
One possible reason why international actors do not speak up for auctions is because in a well-
designed system individual governmental actors would not profit from it. Governmental 
officials are in a dilemma of personal interest vs. common interest. The moment bribes decrease 
the officials get less money but the deployment increases due to lower investment costs.  
However, even though not all risks will be removed by introducing an auctioning system, it 
might still be the better system for Vietnam and similar countries. It would give more security 
to the government since expenses would be project-based, and for developers because they will 
get the price they need to carry out a project. 
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7 Conclusion 
This chapter gives policy recommendation, shows the significance and impact of the research 
and indicates further research fields. This thesis is an analysis of RE investment barriers in 
Vietnam. The research design of this thesis consists out of four steps 1) identifying and 
describing the country context 2) analyzing the effectiveness of current policies 3) identifying 
barriers and risks 4) developing policy scenarios with de-risk instrument.  
The first step, the identification and description of the country context, allowed to answer 
research question # 1: How conducive is Vietnam’s contextual setting to renewable energy investment?  
This thesis found, that even though Vietnam’s climatic conditions are favorable for RE projects, 
it’s contextual setting is not conducive. An ex-post effectiveness analysis of current policies in 
chapter 5.1 demonstrated that the current policies are not effective. The renewable energy 
deployment rates are low, which is an indicator that more/ different de-risking instrument 
should be applied. This makes it legitimate to ask research question #2.: “What are possible ways 
to de-risk renewable energy investments in Vietnam?”  
The development of a new de-risking framework, based on an existing UNDP framework, 
helped to successfully identify barriers and matching de-risking instrument. The identification 
of barriers showed that deep-rooted structural barriers are the main problem for slow RE 
deployment in Vietnam. The permitting process is complex & time consuming, the diffusion of 
information as well as the communication and cooperation among (public) actors is insufficient. 
An omnipresent barrier is corruption. The analysis further showed, that the access to capital for 
large-scale RE project is difficult. On the informational side, there is a lack of know-how and a 
lack of skilled labor. The current RE support policy mix, which includes a FiT does not remove 
the barriers. 
An ex-ante policy analysis was conducted in chapter 6 with several policy scenarios, that simulate 
possible ways to de-risk renewable energy investments in Vietnam. Three scenarios analysed 
secondary de-risk instruments, while two analyse different cornerstone instruments. The 
analysed secondary de-risk scenarios are an improved access to capital, a better skilled workforce 
and an increased cooperation/ communication among public actors. The different cornerstone 
instrument scenarios are a higher FiT and an auctioning system.  
Recommendations  
There are many ways to design a policy mix to remove investment barriers. However, the results 
of this thesis suggest to change the cornerstone instrument to an auctioning system. Unlike 
(high) FiTs, the “One Stop Auctioning System” (OSAS) developed in this thesis has the chance 
to remove deep-rooted investment barriers. An increased FiT, which is promoted by most 
international actor in Vietnam, could lead to higher deployment rates eventually. However, most 
likely it would come at the cost of the local population in Vietnam who had to pay with their 
electricity bill for bribes in the RE permitting process. The OSAS minimizes the contact 
between investors and local authorities and with it the options for corruption and delays.  
This instrument, combined with secondary de-risk instruments, like capacity building on all 
relevant levels and sectors (public and private), the introduction of a university program on RE, 
improved access to capital by introducing public loan guarantees, has high chances to make 
Vietnam a more attractive country for RE investors. Furthermore, local governments should be 
(financially) incentivized to offer land to project developers. 
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7.1 Significance and Implication of the Research  
This thesis gives an impulse to policymakers as well as international experts who fight 
(unsuccessfully) for higher FITs in emerging economies. The result of this thesis is in particular 
valuable for countries, that are ranked high in the Transparency International corruption index, 
because the OSAS has the chance to remove deep-rooted barriers like corruption.  
The research result is valuable for several actors working on topics related to RE deployment 
in emerging economies and Vietnam in particular. These are, among other, international 
decision makers/ consultants, members of the Vietnamese government, Vietnamese public 
officials and researchers. Governmental officials in Vietnam should re-examine their preference 
concerning their RE de-risking policy mix. At the moment the government gives out RE targets 
that will most likely not be achieved. A main reason for the failure is corruption, in which 
governmental officials are largely involved. If the government wants to keep the FiT and also 
wants to reach the RE targets, there are two options: 1) they reduce corruption 2) they increase 
the FiT. Continuing with bribes makes RE investment expensive. The higher expense would 
have to be carried by the electricity consumers. A better option is the OSAS.  
Within this thesis a new analytical framework was developed to analyse investment barriers. The 
de-risk approach by the UNDP was used as an inspiration, however this study revealed that the 
official approach has shortcomings, especially in the usability. The new framework is problem 
oriented, and easier to use. This new framework can help researchers as well as policy makers 
to identify barriers and to consequently develop de-risking policy mixes.  
7.2 Further Studies 
During the research for this thesis several recommendations for further studies arose. The 
analytical framework of this thesis is new. It should be applied to other countries to gain 
experiences with it and to adjust/ improve it. This is also the case for the new auctioning system 
“OSAS”.  Fellow researcher should evaluate it, improve it and further develop it. The question 
on how to incentivise local public actors to offer land to RE project developers in centrally 
governed countries should also be further investigated.  
The de-risk RE investment literature has very little information about corruption and how to 
remove it. Corruption should be moved into the focus of de-risking, since it is a big RE 
investment barrier.  
While conducting the research it might have been helpful, that the research on barrier in 
Vietnam and possible de-risking approaches was conducted by an “outsider” who is not 
involved in lobbying activities, nor has specific conceptions about the Vietnamese energy 
market and it actors. It might also have helped that none of the interviews was conducted with 
a public servant. However, the perspective of the “other side”- the side of EVN and the 
Vietnamese Government is missing in this research. Interviewing them and asking for their 
ideas on how to de-risk RE investments would be interesting.   
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Appendix 
 
 
Table 15: Electricity Prices for Domestic Activities 
Source: (MOIT, 2015) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tariff Urban areas  Rural areas  
Price per unit 
(VND/kWh) 
Price per unit 
(USD/kWh) 
Price per unit 
(VND/kWh) 
Price per unit 
(USD/kWh) 
Level 1: 
0 - 50 kWh 
1,484 6.7 1,230 5.6 
Level 2: 
51 - 100 kWh 
1,533 7.0 1,279 5.8 
Level 3: 
101 - 200 kWh 
1,786 8.1 1,394 6.3 
Level 4: 
201 - 300 kWh 
2,242 10.2 1,720 7.8 
Level 5: 
301 - 400 kWh 
2,503 11.4 1,945 8.8 
 
Level 6: 
above 401 kWh 
2,587 11.8 2,028 9.2 
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7.3 Interview Partner 
Table 16: Interview Partners 
 
Date Name Position Organisation 
January 25, 2016 Daniel Plankermann 
 
Energy Sector Coordinator at 
KfW 
Kreditanstalt für 
Wiederaufbau 
February 15, 2016 Axel Neubert Country Represeantative Hanns Seidel Foundation 
February 15, 2016 Moritz Michel Deputy Director Hanns Seidel Foundation 
February 22, 2016 Rainer Brohm 
 
Independent Energy 
Consultant 
Independent Energy 
Consultant 
February 22, 2016 Peter Cattelaens 
 
Project Manager  German Agency for 
International Co-operation 
March 10, 2016 Franziska Lang Attachée Commercial and 
Economic Affairs 
Development Cooperation  
Embassy of the Federal 
Republic of Germany 
March 11, 2016 Dinh Diep Anh Tuan Chief of Cabinet Dragon Institute 
March 13, 2016 Prof. Dr. Le Anh Tuan 
 
Assoc. Prof. Dr. in Earth 
Sciences 
Dragon Institute 
March 14, 2016 
 
Dr. Cung Vu 
 
Global Associate Director for 
Power and Energy 
Hawaii Natural Energy 
Institute (HNEI)/ Office 
of Narval Research 
March 14, 2016 
 
Dr. Ing. Nguyen Vo 
Chau Ngan 
Deputy Director, Department 
of International Relations 
Can Tho University 
March 14, 2016 
 
Kjeld Ingvorsen Associate Professor Aarhus University, 
Denmark, Faculty of 
Science and Technology 
March 17, 2016 Ms Vu Chi Mai  Project Officer German Agency for 
International Co-operation 
March 17, 2016 Ms Nguyen Tuong 
Khanh 
Project Officer German Agency for 
International Co-operation 
March 24, 2016 Yen Hai Mai Project Manager  Hanns Seidel Foundation 
April 8, 2016 Tran Thuy Duong  
 
Programme Officer  
Development Cooperation 
Section 
Delegation of the European 
Union to Vietnam 
April 5, 2016 Tom Corrie 
 
Counsellor – Deputy Head of 
Cooperation 
Delegation of the 
European Union to 
Vietnam 
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7.4 Sample Interview Questions  
I. Policy De-Risk Instruments 
1a. Long-term Wind Power target 
 What is your opinion about the long term wind power targets? 
 On a scale from 1-5 how reliable are the set targets in your opinion? 
 On a scale from 1-5 how well designed are they in your opinion? 
2a. Stream lined permits process 
 What is your opinion about the permit process for wind power projects? 
o Where do you see room for improvement?  
 On a scale from 1-5 how easy is it for wind power project developer to obtain a 
permit? 
3a. Operation and Maintenance Skills 
 Do you now of any workshops and trainings for wind power O&M provided in Viet 
Nam? 
 On a scale from 1-5 how much wind power O&M knowledge can be found in 
Vietnam?  
II. Financial De-Risk Instruments 
1a. Public loans 
 Do you now of any public loans for Wind Power Projects? 
 On a scale from 1-5 how well are they designed in order to increase wind power 
deployment? 
2a. Partial loan guarantee 
 Do you now of any partial loan guarantees for wind power projects? 
 On a scale from 1-5 how well are they designed in order to increase wind power 
deployment? 
3a. Political risk insurance 
 Do you now of any political risk insurances for wind power projects? 
 On a scale from 1-5 how well are they designed in order to increase wind power 
deployment? 
III. Direct Financial Incentives 
1a. Feed in Tariff for Wind Power Projects 
 On a scale from 1-5 how well is the FiT designed in order to increase wind power 
deployment? 
 What is lacking? 
2a. Tax credits 
 On a scale from 1- 5 how much are the tax credits helping to increase wind power 
deployment? 
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